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Note
Recourse Under § 10(b) on Life Support: The
Displacement of Liability and Private Securities
Fraud Action after Janus v. FirstDerivative
Enzo Incandela*

I. INTRODUCTION
At the height of the roaring stock market in the 1920s, one of the
problems facing investors was the scarcity of companies in which to
invest.I Market participants responded to the demand by issuing
common stock in investment companies and/or investment trusts. 2
These new securities were structures in which an investment company
would purchase and manage a securities portfolio for a pool of small
investors.3 The design of an investment trust was simple: a sponsor
would execute a management advisory agreement with the trust the
sponsor created, and in exchange, the sponsor would receive a
management fee based on a percentage of the assets under management
or the earnings the trust made. 4 The sponsor would run the day-to-day
* Loyola University Chicago School of Law, J.D. expected May 2013. I would like to
acknowledge Loyola University Chicago School of Law Professors Samuel Brunson and Steven
Ramirez for their sage advice in structuring this Note. I would also like to thank the Loyola
University Chicago Law Journal editorial board and members, especially Joe Schaedler, Susan
Baker, Eric VanderPloeg, and Bruce Van Baren for their exhaustive work. Most importantly, I
would like to thank my wife Colleen for her loving support and saintly patience during this
process and throughout law school.
1. JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 43 (1954).

2. Id. at 46; see also Karen Reams, Wall Street in the Roaring Twenties, YAHOO! VOICES

(June 26, 2007), http://voices.yahoo.com/wall-street-roaring-twenties-403302.html (discussing
the increase in market-related activity that led to an increase in investors and the development of
new investment products to meet the demand).
3. GALBRAITH, supra note 1, at 47-48. The investment trusts of the 1920s are similar to the
structure of a closed-end fund today, except without as much leverage as the products created in
that era. Id; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1116 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a closed-end

fund as "[a] mutual fund having a fixed number of shares that are traded on a major securities
exchange or an over-the-counter market").
4.

GALBRAITH, supra note 1, at 50.

For example, the manager would charge one percent

annually on a portfolio that had one hundred thousand dollars in it, or if the fund met a threshold
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operations of the trust, invest the assets, handle the administrative
duties, and even provide some of the board members of the trust.5 At
the time, these investment vehicles were perceived as marvels of
financial innovation and ingenuity. 6
In late 1928, less than a year before the peak and subsequent crash of
the market, Goldman, Sachs and Co. entered the then booming market
with its sponsorship of an investment trust called the Goldman Sachs
Trading Corporation ("GSTC").7 The GSTC was an amazing success
and later spawned the issuance of the Shenandoah Corporation and the
Blue Ridge Corporation.8 Despite the amazing success of the Goldman,
Sachs and Co. issuances, the market experienced a historic crash, and
the investment trusts suffered great losses. 9
gain of say five percent, the fund would take, as its fee, a portion of any further gain above that
five percent.

See Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, SEC.Gov, http://www.sec.gov/answers/

mffees.htm (last modified Nov. 4, 2011) (including a general discussion of different mutual fund
fees).
5.

GALBRAITH, supra note 1, at 50.

6. See id. at 52 (stating that some commentators regretted that there were not enough of these
vehicles in circulation and that everyone could not benefit from "these new engines of financial
progress").
7.

Id at 60; see also George Spritzer, 1929's Closed End Fund Craze: Lessons For Today,

SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 5, 2007), http://seekingalpha.com/article/26041-1929-s-closed-end-fundcraze-lessons-for-today (noting that Goldman Sachs was the largest promoter of closed-end funds
during the 1928-1929 time period).
8. GALBRAITH, supra note 1, at 61-62. GSTC raised $100 million at issuance. Id. at 61.
Shenandoah and Blue Ridge raised $102.5 million and $142 million, respectively. Id at 61-62.
This is an astonishing collective amount given that it was raised in about nine months. Id. at 6062. Today, that amount, adjusted for inflation, would be $4.57 billion, see CPI Inflation
Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/datalinflation-calculator.htm

(last visited Apr. 21, 2012), and that was only the amount raised at initial offering from mostly
individual investors. Id. at 61. For a more descriptive explanation of how GSTC used leverage to
create the new investment trusts called Shenandoah and Blue Ridge, see GALBRAITH, supra note
1,at 57-64.
9. See GALBRAITH, supra note 1, at 64-65. At a subsequent Senate Committee hearing
investigating the market crash, the impacts to the GSTC offering were discussed in the following
exchange:
Senator Couzens: Did Goldman, Sachs and Company organize the Goldman Sachs
Trading Corporation?
Mr. Sachs: Yes, sir.
Senator Couzens: And it sold its stock to the public?
Mr. Sachs: A portion of it. The firm invested originally in 10 percent of the entire issue
for the sum of $10,000,000.
Senator Couzens: And the other 90 percent was sold to the public?
Mr. Sachs: Yes, sir.
Senator Couzens: At what price?
Mr. Sachs: At 104. That is the old stock. . . the stock was split two for one.
Senator Couzens: And what is the price of the stock now?
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These events preceded the enactment of federal securities laws and
the formation of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC");
hence, federal regulatory penalties for foul play were not an option for
either investors seeking recourse or the federal government looking to
prosecute potentially fraudulent actors.10 Nevertheless, Goldman,
Sachs and Co. was besieged with lawsuits from personal investors, the
last of which settled in 1967."
Investments such as the GSTC,
Shenandoah, and Blue Ridge-all three similar to today's mutual
funds-were the driving force behind the well-constructed securities
laws of the 1930s, and, along with the creation of the SEC, these federal
securities laws have helped deter corporate actors from fraudulent
activities. 12 Additionally, coupling these market watchmen with a
Mr. Sachs: Approximately 1 3/4.
Id; see also Harry Wilson, A Short History of Goldman Sachs in Losses, FINANCIAL NEWS (Dec.

16, 2008), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2008-12-16/a-short-history-of-goldman-sachsin-losses-I (describing GSTC's performance as "one of the largest, swiftest, and most complete
investment disasters of the twentieth century," leaving the Sachs family amazed at the damage
caused to the firm's reputation and most Goldman Sachs partners, at the time, owing the firm
money for years to recoup the loss).
10. See Deepa Sarkar, Comell Law School Securities Law Clinic, Why Securities Laws?,
LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edulwex/securities law history (last visited Apr. 21,
2012) (asserting that, in many cases, promises made by companies and brokers about the
companies they were promoting had little to no substantive basis or were wholly fraudulent
leading to a speculative frenzy in which thousands of investors bought stocks in hopes of huge
profits, and adding that prior to federal securities laws, investors mainly looked to state securities
laws (known as blue sky laws); however, each state had its own interpretation and protections that
could leave investors with limited options for recourse); see also The Investor's Advocate: How
the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and FacilitatesCapital Formation, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified Apr.

11, 2012) (discussing the minimal support for federal regulation of the securities markets prior to
the market crash of 1929 and noting that there was never serious pursuit of federal government
involvement in the regulation of a company's financial disclosure requirement and the fraudulent
sale of stock).
11. See Marco v. Bank of N.Y., 272 F. Supp. 636, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (dismissing all
liability claims of liability against Walter E. Sachs because the claims were barred by statutes of
limitations). The case resulted from the Blue Ridge Corporation investments, and the plaintiff
pursued claims of breach of fiduciary duties by the directors of Blue Ridge in their handling of
investments. Id. at 639.
12. See The Investor's Advocate, supra note 10 (stating that the SEC's mission is "to protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation"). The
SEC adds that in its oversight of exchanges, securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors,
and mutual funds, its primary concern is "[promoting] the disclosure of important market-related
information, maintaining fair dealing, and protecting against fraud." Id.; see also A BriefHistory
of Securities Regulation, ST. WISCONSIN DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., http://www.wdfi.org/fi/securities/

regexemp/history.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (noting that, aside from the 1933 Act and the
1934 Act, Congress passed securities regulation that included the Public Utility Holding Act of
1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, all with the intention to regulate the securities industry).
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robust private right of action under § 10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5"catchall" antifraud provisions designed to combat manipulative or
deceptive actions that may occur during securities transactions 13 added further deterrence, while enabling the private investor to seek
remedies under federal law as opposed to the common law of contract. 14
Unfortunately, the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Janus
CapitalGroup v. FirstDerivative Traders,1 5 is the latest example of the
Court's apparent desire to completely abolish the implied private right
of action under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 and return to an era in which
victims of securities fraud litigate their grievances based on the
common law of contract-similar to investors of the GSTC.16
In today's market environment, protecting a broad application of the
private right of action against securities fraud is imperative." The SEC
has faced funding restrictions, and the reduction in available resources
has limited its oversight capabilities. 18 Also, anti-regulatory headwinds
13. See Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5: The Continued
Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Requirement 1 (Aug. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/eric-chaffee/1 (discussing the
reason Congress drafted § 10(b) and asserting that Rule lob-5 is a powerful tool for fighting
securities fraud).
14. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (describing the private right of
action as a necessary supplement to SEC because it is a means to deter fraudulent actions); see
also, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 555 (1981) (noting that
one of the two significant principles of the Borak decision was the Court's emphasis on the
deterrent effect of private enforcement). The Court has moved away from the Borak rationale for
the implied right of action but has not specifically overturned it. Frankel, supra, at 553; see also
Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact,56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 379 (2007) (statement of

SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid) ("Private enforcement is a necessary supplement to the
work that the [SEC] does. It is a safety valve against the potential capture of the agency by
industry.").
15. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
16. See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of
Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 547 (1999) ("The

common law has not been, and in the near future is not likely to be, an adequate substitute for
statutory protection. The federal securities laws . . . provide a national standard-a benchmark
that promotes uniformity."); see also G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under
Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be
Effective Only Against White-CollarCrime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 562-64 (1987) ("The

struggle for the soul of the nation is today being fought anew in the business community, bar
associations, Congress, and the courts. It has many names: it is called 'strict constructionism'; it
is called 'antitrust reform'; it is called 'tort reform' .... ).
17. See Issacharoff,supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing private enforcement of
securities laws); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal

Law in Preventing CorporateCrime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 969 (2003) (asserting that private suits
express community norms and have a deterrent effect when the threat of civil litigation enhances
the risks for would-be fraudulent actors to engage in even marginally lawful conduct).
18.

Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Officials Say the Agency Lacks Cash for Full Oversight,
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in the political arena create obstacles for the SEC to carry out its
objectives.19 For regulators and investors alike, the apolitical private
right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 serves as an essential
supplement to the ongoing focus of maintaining an orderly financial
marketplace governed by the rule of law. 20
This Note examines the history of the implied private right of action
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and posits that the Court's decision in
Janus has eviscerated this implied right so unmercifully that it will be
difficult, if not impossible, for investors to seek redress for securities
fraud through private litigation.21 Part II of this Note provides a general
background of securities fraud regulation with an emphasis on § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 and the recognition of the implied private right of
action. 22 It also chronicles both congressional and judicial retrenchment
WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/27/
AR2009012703395.html (discussing testimony by SEC officials in front of a Congressional panel
where they warned that the lack of money and staff was a detriment to the agency's ability to
ensure comprehensive oversight). SEC chairman Mary Schapiro stated: "The amount of
resources available to the SEC has not kept pace with the rapid expansion in the securities market
over the past few years ... either in terms of the number of firms or the explosion in the types of
new and increasingly complex products .. . some of which were expressly designed to avoid SEC
regulation and oversight." Id.
19. See Brian Powell, Rep. Darrell Issa: The Face of Today's Deregulation Movement,
MEDIA

MATTERS

ACTION

NETWORK

BLOG

(Mar.

24,

2011,

3:19

PM),

http://politicalcorrection.org/mobile/blog/201103240018 (discussing Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA),
the chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, who solicited letters
from over 150 trade associations, conservative think tanks, and corporations, asking them for
suggestions on which federal regulations he should be targeting for investigation); see also
Christopher Maag, Anti-Regulation Bank Regulator Draws Democrats' Ire, CREDIT.COM BLOG

(June 25, 2011), http://www.credit.com/blog/2011/06/this-time-the-anti-regulation-regulator-getsnoticed/ (statement of John Walsh, acting director of the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency) ("To put it plainly, my view is that we are in danger of trying to squeeze too much risk
and complexity out of banking as we institute reforms to address problems and abuses stemming
from the last crisis.").
20. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence

and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1545-48 (2006) (asserting that, despite the
lack of a compensatory rationale-in terms of investor loss recovery-for securities class actions,
the private right of action does have a deterrence benefit, in that, corporate insiders face an
expected penalty that exceeds their expected gain thereby reducing or removing any incentive for
them to commit securities fraud); see also Welle, supra note 16, at 581 (discussing that those who
propose that investors be protected by an efficient market, rather than standards of law, are
misguided in thinking that all investors are knowledgeable, sophisticated, and have exposure to
perfect information).
21. Edward Pekarek & Genavieve Shingle, The Make Believe of Janus 8-9 (Oct. 12, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1942748 (asserting that the Janus
decision "may have ushered in an era that may only make the capital markets increasingly risky
for the investing public, and stock market charlatans can almost be heard saying, 'go ahead, make
my day').
22. See infra Part II.A-C (discussing a history of federal securities law and the creation of the
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of private recourse for securities fraud.23 Part III discusses the
progression of the Janus litigation, starting with a background of the
case, and then proceeding from the district court's decision to the
Supreme Court's majority opinion and dissent. 24 Part IV analyzes three
areas of securities fraud litigation affected by the Janus decision: (1)
primary/secondary liability for securities fraud; (2) what constitutes the
"making" of a statement as it pertains to private action liability under
securities laws; and (3) the Court's use of the "ultimate control over the
content of a statement" test to shield investment advisors from liability
under 1Ob-5. 2 5 Part V explores the potential impact of Janus on the
future of securities fraud litigation-namely, that this decision may
have the unintended effect of creating a new veil to liability for both
managers in their role as agents of the corporation and some of the most
important actors in the financial asset securitization industry.26

II. BACKGROUND
A. History ofSecurities Regulation
In response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great
Depression, Congress stepped in to restore confidence in financial
markets. 27 Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") to
regulate public stock offerings and require that underwriters make
specific disclosures prior to an initial public offering. 28 The 1933 Act
implied private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5).
23. See infra Part II.D-E (discussing Congressional acts and Supreme Court decisions that
have decreased the effectiveness of the implied private right of action under § 10(b)).
24. See infra Part III (discussing Janus'scase history).
25. See infra Part IV (discussing three areas of securities fraud affected by Janus).
26. See infra Part V (arguing the impacts of Janus on securities fraud litigation).
27. See John H. Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral PurposeInspiring
Federal Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1015, 1018 (2001)
(describing the inspiration behind a new regulatory regime within the financial sector as
"prohibiting conduct inconsistent with ethical principles; empowering the SEC to preserve the
character of the securities industry by expelling the unfit; and requiring securities exchanges and
associations to adopt rules enforcing just and equitable principles of trade"); see also Welle,
supra note 16, at 534 (noting that investigations conducted prior to the enactment of federal
securities laws revealed widespread fraud, manipulation, and victimization of investors).
28. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006) ("Whenever pursuant to this subchapter
the Commission is engaged in rule-making and is required to consider whether an action is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider . . . whether
the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation."); see also The Laws that
Govern the Securities Industry: Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last modified Feb. 15, 2012) (referring to the 1933 Act as
the "truth in securities" law).
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requires a corporation to file a registration statement for the securities it
plans on offering to the public. 29 The goal of requiring registration was
to promote truthful, full disclosure of information and potential risks of
investing in the securities being offered, so as to allow the public the
ibility to make informed investment decisions. 30 Shortly thereafter,
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"),
which created the SEC to regulate the secondary market for securities
transactions. 3 1 The 1934 Act was credited with helping to promote fair
dealing within the U.S. capital markets. 32 Specifically, the Act provides
the SEC with enforcement power to address fraudulent behavior that
would otherwise diminish confidence among market participants and
restrict the orderly flow of capital.33 The orderly flow of capital is an
important phenomenon for free-market economies and is built on
foundations of trust and compliance within a structured system; without
these characteristics, our economic system would struggle to exist.3 4
29. See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, A HistoricalIntroductionto the Securities
Act of 1933 & the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 330 (1988) (stating that

the 1933 Act aimed to regulate the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails"); see
also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1189 (9th ed. 2009) (defining an initial public offering as "[a]
company's first public sale of stock; the first offering of an issuer's equity securities to the public
through a registration statement").
30. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 29, at 338 (noting that, in a speech before Congress in
March of 1933, President Roosevelt recommended that the purpose for the new laws be "for
Federal supervision of traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce"). The President
also said that the new legislation should not be considered a guarantee; rather, the benefit would
be the full disclosure of information to the potential buyer. Id.; see also Securities Act of 1933,
SECURITIES-FRAUD.COM, http://www.securities-fraud.com/laws.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012)
(describing elements of the 1933 Act and listing the requirements of the registration process).
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78pp).
32. See Walsh, supra note 27, at 1068-69 (statement of Franklin D. Roosevelt at the signing
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940) ("[A] conscientious and successful effort ha[d] been
made to require the investment banker, the broker, and the dealer, the security salesman, the
issuer, and the great financial institutions themselves to recognize the high responsibilities they
owe to the public.").
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (laying out the establishment of the SEC and detailing its structure,
functions, and powers of enforcement); see also Welle, supra note 16, at 534 (stating that the goal
of federal securities regulation is to protect investors by prohibiting fraudulent manipulation and
by requiring sufficient disclosure by public corporations in order to provide investors with
enough information to make informed investment decisions).
34. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 29, at 340 (discussing the period following the stock
market crash of the 1920s). Felix Frankfurter, special advisor to President Roosevelt, who was
highly influential in the creation of Federal securities laws, stated:
The great and buoyant faith in capitalism, in the competitive system, is largely
deflated, and ... it is not only a question of whether the system is just, but whether it
works. When you have a system which is questioned by the masses, that system
cannot last unless it wins back the loyalty and allegiance of the doubter.
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While both Acts cover many areas that relate to securities regulation,
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act has garnered the most influence in terms of the
implied private right of action.
B. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b)
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act generally prohibits any manipulation or
deception that is intended to mislead investors during the course of a
securities offering. 35 It is widely accepted that § 10(b) was an
expansion of protections offered to investors that previously depended
on state securities regulations and common law. 3 6 In 1942, pursuant to
statutory language, the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5(b), an anti-fraud
provision proscribing the making of untrue statements or material
omission in regard to material facts associated with the purchase or sale
of a security. 37 The SEC promulgated a broad rule because it realized
Id.; see also Welle, supra note 16, at 568 (arguing that a diminished regulatory environment
could erode investor confidence).

35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered ... any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id.; see also U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) ("[Section 10(b) is] not an all-purpose
breach of fiduciary duty ban, but trains on conduct that is manipulative or deceptive.").
36. See Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983) (noting that
securities laws were generally intended "to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available
common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry");
see also Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does It Have a Future After Stoneridge?, 2009

Wis. L. REv. 351, 359 (asserting that the expansion purposes of § 10(b) are offered as a
supplement to protections by common law fraud and state securities statutes that are often illequipped to adequately protect investors).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Id.; see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977) (stating that the SEC
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that fraudulent activities in 1934 would not be the same as securities
fraud fifty years into the future and so the broad rule would provide
flexibility to deal with issues it did not/could not anticipate in 1934.38
C. Recognition of an Implied PrivateRight ofAction under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5

In addition to the SEC's power to enforce and prosecute securities
fraud, a private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 was
developed through judicial interpretation of the statute and the rule. 39
Although neither Congress nor the SEC intended to explicitly grant a
private right of action for violations of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the
Supreme Court recognized such a rich right in a 1971 case,
Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co.40 In Bankers Life, writing for the majority, Justice Douglas said

that by instituting § 10(b), Congress did not merely seek to address
corporate mismanagement; rather, Congress meant to regulate
"deceptive devices and contrivances" that relate to securities
transactions in general. 41 The standard to pursue a claim under § 10(b)
was broad and the "in connection with" requirement found in § 10(b)
included "[any] injury [suffered] as a result of deceptive practices
touching [the] sale of securities and an investor." 42 The Court
adopted Rule 1Ob-5 pursuant to authority granted by § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and that it gives the
SEC "the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the
statute"). However, the Court added that the SEC cannot exceed the power granted under
§ 10(b). Id
38. See Prentice,supra note 36, at 360 (asserting that "Congress gave the Commission a broad
charge so that it could attack frauds that Congress could not foresee in 1934," and together with
§ 10(b), they formed a sort of "catchall" provision to monitor fraud in the marketplace); see also
Welle, supra note 16, at 535-36 (noting Congress recognized the "boundlessness of human
ingenuity" and broadly drew the scope of the securities law to help achieve its goal of investor
protection).
39. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (recognizing the
private right of action under the 1934 Act for the first time in federal court); see also Jonathan
Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five Defenses Securities Litigators Need to Know, 62

Bus. LAW. 1281, 1331-34 (2007) (discussing implied private rights of action).
40. 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1331 (stating that prior to
1975, the Supreme Court's approach to the private right of action under § 10(b) was that "it is the
duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose").
41. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12. The case was before the Court from the granting of a motion
to dismiss, and the Court remanded, finding that a proper cause of action had been brought forth
under § 10(b). Id. at 13-14.
42. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added); see also Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Rule
10b-5's "In Connection With": A Nexus for Securities Fraud,57 BUs. LAW. 1, 8 (2001) (noting

that Justice Douglas, a former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, gave the
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characterized "touching" as including any corporate manager
malfeasance, misappropriation, or fraudulent action that had a securities
connection as falling under the jurisdiction of Rule lOb-5-an
inherently broad application of the Rule. 4 3
Four years later, in what could be deemed its first act of retrenchment
of the private right of action,44 the United States Supreme Court decided
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.4 5 In Blue Chip, writing for
the majority, Justice Rehnquist held that standing to bring a private
cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 would be limited to
purchasers or sellers of securities. 4 6 A group of plaintiffs had brought a
class action against the defendants alleging that an "overly pessimistic"
prospectus prepared by the defendants was misleading and caused the
plaintiffs to refrain from buying stock that was later sold to the public at
a higher price. 4 7 Justice Rehnquist was skeptical that these plaintiffs
could prove that the misrepresentations actually caused the loss of
opportunity. 48 He warned against trying to determine the mindset of
market participants who claimed securities fraud despite not purchasing
or selling an actual security. 4 9 Though the Court began to reign in the
scope of coverage for private claims against securities fraud, federal
private right of action under § 10(b) a broad interpretation, allowing anything "touching" a
securities transaction to be regulated under the law).
43. See Barbara Black, Commentary: The Second Circuit's Approach to the 'In Connection
With' Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 539, 547-48 (1987) (adding that the "in
connection with" requirement was distinctive from a state-law fiduciary duties claim previously
brought by investors who were harmed by securities fraud); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at
1288 (stating that under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"), claims in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities in class actions cannot be brought under state
law or in state court).
44. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 42, at 10 ("Blue Chip clearly limited the scope of
the holding in Bankers Life as well as the overall scope and coverage of lOb-5."); see also infra
Part II.E (detailing more recent judicial retrenchment of private claims under § 10(b) and Rule
I Ob-5).
45. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The Court reversed the court of appeals decision because
respondents could not pursue the claim for lack of standing. Id. at 755.
46. Id. at 731; see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 42, at 10 (discussing the tone and
words of Blue Chip as indicating the Courts intention to curb private actions under 1Ob-5).
47. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 726-27.
48. See id. at 746 ("The very real risk in permitting those in respondent's position to sue under
Rule lOb-5 is that the door will be open to recovery of substantial damages on the part of one
who offers only his own testimony to prove that he ever consulted a prospectus of the issuer, that
he paid any attention to it, or that the representations contained in it damaged him.").
49. See Robert A. Prentice, Section 12 of the 1933 Act: Establishingthe Statutory Seller, 40
ALA. L. REv. 417, 470-71 (1989) (arguing that the Court's interpretation was too narrow and that
statutory sellers could include, but be limited to, those who solicit securities transactions such as
stockbrokers).
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legislative activity on the matter was, for the most part, nonexistent
since the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 50
D. CongressionalPrivateAction Reform

In time, the sense that private securities actions were becoming
disproportionately non-meritorious grew. 5 1 In particular, market
participants complained that the proliferation of "strike suits" 52 was
causing deficiencies in the marketplace and increased costs to public
firms that affected shareholder value. 53
Congress responded by passing the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 54 over a veto by President Clinton,55

50. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 42, at 9 (describing the SEC's request to Congress
in 1957, and again in 1959, to change wording of § 10(b) to include the phrase "any attempt to
purchase or sell" in the statute, which would broaden the coverage of regulation-Congress never
adopted the change, however). In the 1990s, Congress broke from an inactive posture and was
active in passing securities legislation. See Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1350 n.425 (discussing
the National Securities Market Improvement Act ("NSMIA") passed in 1996 and the SLUSA in
1998). Also, the major legislative enactment relating to private securities litigation was the
PSLRA in 1995. Id at 1302-03.
51. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730. The
legislative history of the PSLRA shows that Congress explicitly tried to address the issue of
frivolous securities fraud filings stating, "routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities
and others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without regard to any
underlying culpability of the issuer and with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead
eventually to some plausible cause of action." Id.; see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501
U.S. 1083, 1105 (1991) (stating that preventing frivolous suits is a good reason to deny private
securities claims in the absence of congressional intent); Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1288
(asserting that courts have deemed "puffery" as a non-actionable claim under private securities
actions).
52. See Joshua D. Fulop, Agency Costs and The Strike Suit: Reducing Frivolous Litigation
Through Empowerment of Shareholders, 7 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 213, 215 (2007) (defining a strike
suit as litigation that is "usually based on no valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or to
obtain a settlement").
53. Id. at 216.
54. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18

U.S.C.).
55. 141 CONG. REc. H15214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (veto message of President Clinton)
(describing his reservations about the bill, President Clinton said that the changes to the bill by a
Conference Committee would "have the effect of closing the courthouse door on investors who
have legitimate claims"); see also John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and
Winding Road to the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335, 352-53
(1996) (discussing the three main elemental objections President Clinton had with the bill
including the (1) "heightened pleading requirements with regard to the defendant's state of
mind," (2) the language of the Statement of Managers, which would be used by the courts as a
guide to congressional intent, and (3) the "disparate treatment of plaintiffs and defendants under
the bill's provision for sanctions for violations of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure").
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to address alleged frivolous securities class action lawsuits. 56
Specifically, the PSLRA attempted to stem the escalation of suits
brought by plaintiffs as an attempt to unearth fraud through discovery,
which would, in turn, lead to settlement. 7 One of the most important
legal changes to come from the PSLRA was the heightening of pleading
requirements.58 In a securities action, the plaintiff needs to show that
the defendant acted with a "particular state of mind"-also known as
"scienter." 59 Specifically, the plaintiff must show facts that give "rise to
a strong inference" that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind. 60 The PSLRA also included a provision that allowed a court to
sanction an attorney who brings forth a frivolous securities fraud class
action lawsuit. 6 1 Not surprisingly, statistics show that the number of
56. 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

§ 1301.1 (3d ed. 2004); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1392 (stating that Congress passed
the PSLRA to impose "procedural protections to discourage frivolous litigation").
57. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 56, § 1301.1 (adding that Congress was concerned
that federal courts were not effectively applying Federal Rule 9(b) to prevent cases that were filed
to simply unearth fraud during the discovery process); see also Avery, supra note 55, at 340
("Despite the lack of clear statistical support, many observers believe that there is at least a strong
public perception of a securities litigation crisis."). Testimony before a House Subcommittee
emphasized that perception of a crisis in the U.S. securities litigation system could affect the
competitiveness of the U.S. economy in the global marketplace. Id.
58. See Avery, supra note 55, at 357-58 (stating that due to the PSLRA, "the complaint
[must] specify each statement alleged to have been misleading and the [reason or] reasons why
the statement is misleading"); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1392 (discussing the
differences between Rule 12(b)(6) and the stricter pleading standards of the PSLRA).
59. See Securities Litigation Reform Proposals, S. 240, S. 667, and H.R. 1058: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,

104th Cong., 252 (1995) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC). Testifying before the
subcommittee, Chairman Levitt described his reservations about the heightened pleading
standards:
The law should sanction corporations and individuals who act recklessly in connection
with their disclosure obligations, because that is the only way to assure the markets of a
continuous stream of accurate information. Any higher scienter standard would lessen
the incentives for corporations and other issuers to conduct a full inquiry into areas of
potential exposure, and thus threaten the process that has made our markets a model for
nations around the world.
Id.; see also Avery, supra note 55, at 358 (noting that the heightened pleading standard was one
of the reasons that President Clinton opposed the PSLRA).
60. See Avery, supra note 55, at 358 ("The court is required to dismiss a complaint that does
not meet these statutory pleading requirements and all discovery is stayed during the pendency of
any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds that any particularized discovery is necessary to
preserve evidence or prevent undue prejudice."); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1392
(asserting that the PSLRA significantly increased the pleading standards beyond Rule 9(b)).
61. Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1489, 1507 (2006). Congress

mandated judicial review of every private securities suit, and if a violation was found, sanctions
would be mandatory. Id These sanctions would include the opposing party's attorney's fees and
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class action filings drastically decreased after Congress enacted the
PSLRA.6 2 Today, most cases continue to settle due to the high cost of
trial, and investors recover a smaller percentage of their losses since the
large number of shareholders necessary to support such a class action
dilutes the total recovery. 63 Congress intended for the PSLRA to
eliminate frivolous law suits. 64 Instead, the resulting effect of the
legislation has been to throw out the good with the bad: meritorious
securities fraud claims have little chance of success as well.65 Further,
the disconnect between what Congress intended the PSLRA to do and
the effect it actually had on securities litigation was widened by how the
courts implemented the PSLRA.6 6

other expenses. Id. A study conducted as part of the article shows that the sanction provision
rarely has been used during the first ten years of the Act. Id. at 1508. Surprisingly, through 2005,
only four sanctions were imposed under the PSLRA mandate. Id.; see also Eisenberg,supra note
39, at 1322 (discussing a case where the court found the complaint to include vague allegations of
fraud and stated that it would invite a motion for Rule II sanctions against the plaintiff).
62. See

STANFORD

LAW

SCHOOL,

SECURITIES

CLASS

ACTION

CLEARINGHOUSE,

http://securities.stanford.edu/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (displaying research showing 991
federal securities class action lawsuits that were filed from 2001-2003; however, only 467 were
filed from Aug. 2009-2011). A majority of the lawsuits filed in 2001 were equity-IPO related.
The lawsuits after the credit crisis relate to bond/structured financial instrument-IPOs. These
IPOs were restricted to institutional investors, while equity-IPOs were also available to retail
investors. See Securities Class Action Filings Decrease Moderately in First Half of 2011,
According to Mid-Year Report By Stanford Law School and Cornerstone Research,

BUSINESSWIRE.COM (July 26, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
(statement of
20110726005738/en/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-Decrease-Moderately-2011
Stanford Law School Professor Joseph Grundfest) ("There appears to be a sea change in the
structure of the class action securities fraud litigation business. The traditional claims that U.S.based companies have been cooking their books or hyping their stocks are in sharp decline.").
63. See Choi & Thompson, supra note 61, at 1497-99 (stating that the study found that since
the PSLRA, filings have shifted away from lower value claims, the time to settle has lengthened,
the percentage of dismissals has varied, there has been an increase in large sum settlements, and
cases against technology companies in the Ninth Circuit has declined).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the
prevention of frivolous suits).
65. Stephen A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing
with the Meritoriousas Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1087 (1999) ("The

PSLRA has the obvious side-effect of throwing out the meritorious with the frivolous. This is
problematic inasmuch as it sacrifices justice in order to chill the pursuit of weak claims.").
66. See Choi & Thompson, supra note 61, at 1490 (asserting that despite Congress's attempt
at curbing frivolous law suits, the PSLRA did not dislodge the dominant plaintiff law firms, nor
did it allow easy access to new entrants). Additionally, the legislation seemed to have spawned a
new "repeat relationship" dynamic between certain plaintiff law firms and specific institutional
investors. Id.
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1. Judicial Treatment of the PSLRA
In the years following the enactment of the PSLRA, a circuit split
developed regarding the level of particularity a plaintiff needed to plead
to satisfy the "strong inference" requirement for scienter. 67 The Ninth
Circuit adopted the most demanding standard for pleading scienter: the
plaintiff needed to show strong circumstantial evidence with great detail
and specificity and a description of how and why those statements were
fraudulent with no concern for reckless behavior. 68 The Second
Circuit-adopting the most liberal of approaches-required the plaintiff
to establish that the defendant had a motive and opportunity to defraud
or plead sufficient circumstantial evidence of reckless or conscious
behavior. 69 Lastly, a number of circuits adopted an intermediate
approach, which examined the plaintiffs allegations in their entirety. 70
67. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 21D(b)(l)(2), 109 Stat. 737 (establishing the pleading requirements regarding a defendant's state of mind).
The specific legislative text disputed was added after § 21C of the 1934 Act and read:
(1) MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS.-In any private action arising
under this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light ofthe circumstances in which they were made, not misleading;
the complaintshall spectfy each statement alleged to have been misleading, the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and,ifan allegation
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief the
complaint shallstate with particularityallfacts on which that belief is formed

(2) REQUIRED STATE OF MIND.-In any private action arising under this title in
which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted
with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this title, state with particularityfacts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the requiredstate of mind

Id. (emphasis added); see also Ramirez, supra note 65, at 1074 (asserting that the PSLRA
pleading standards are a dramatic departure from general standards under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and questioning whether these standards can be satisfied at all without an explicit
admission of intent to defraud). Discovery is denied to a plaintiff unless this heightened pleading
standard is satisfied; "[t]hus, not only must a plaintiff allege facts 'giving rise to a strong
inference' of fraud, the plaintiff also is denied discovery in aid of uncovering such facts." Id. at
1076.
68. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth
Circuit instituted the requirement that plaintiffs "plead, in great detail, facts that constitute strong
circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct." Id.
69. Ryan Lee Hart, Comment, Deterrence and Fairness: Why the Current FinancialCrisis
Demands a Product-OrientedRelaxation of the PSLRA, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 411, 419-20

(2009); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1361 (discussing the Second Circuit's standard as
part of the division amongst circuits as to the proper pleading standard necessary to satisfy the
strong inference requirement).
70. Hart, supra note 69, at 420; see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1362 (supporting the
notion that "most courts of appeals have adopted a standard between that of the Second and the
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Courts in this intermediate regime would weigh all allegations of
motive and opportunity or recklessness in seeking a strong inference of
scienter.7 1
2. The Supreme Court Strengthens the PSLRA
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd 7 2 and resolved how the courts should uniformly construe
the phrase "strong inference." 73 Writing for the majority, Justice
Ginsburg presented three "prescriptions" that courts should follow: (1)
faced with a motion to dismiss a § 10(b) action, courts must "accept all
factual allegations in the complaint as true"; (2) courts must consider
the complaint in its entirety; and (3) when determining whether the
pleadings "give rise to a 'strong' inference of scienter, the court must
take into account plausible opposing inferences . . . . A complaint will
survive . . . only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of

scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference." 74
In adopting a stringent standard for pleading scienter, the Court
reviewed Congress's objective in setting a uniform pleading standard,
which was to curb perceived abuses of § 10(b) private actions. 7 5
The Tellabs case highlights the interrelated workings of an explicit
Congressional act-the PSLRA-and an obliging Supreme Court's
response towards weakening the private right of action under § 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5.76 However, this was not the first time the Court moved
to weaken an investor's right to seek private recourse at law.
Ninth Circuits").
71. Hart, supra note 69, at 420; see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1362 ("It is important to
recognize that even though recklessness is accepted as a form of scienter by many courts, the
standard for recklessness is quite high.").
72. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
73. Id. at 314.
74. Id at 322-24; see also Jeffrey A. Barrack, A Primer on Taking a Securities FraudClass

Action to Trial, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 471, 476-77 (2008) (asserting that the clarification of
pleading standards as set-forth by the PSLRA has propelled an industry trend that will see more
private securities cases proceed to trial rather than end in settlement, and noting that since the
PSLRA "only a half dozen securities fraud cases have made it to a jury").
75. Tellabs, 511 U.S. at 322; see also Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Corruptionand the
Complicity of Congress and the Supreme Court-The Tortuous Path From Central Bank to
Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 188 (2009) ("Congress and the

federal courts are operating in a fairyland world. Unless the accountants decide to recast the
financial statements, or the board of directors or a bankruptcy court initiates an investigation
which is made public, or whistleblowers are found, requiring specificity in pleading without
discovery is an almost insurmountable hurdle, particularly considering the degree of specificity

which many federal courts have required." (emphasis added)).
76. See Murdock, supra note 75, at 209 (stating that the theme of his article was to highlight
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E. Beyond the PSLRA: JudicialRetrenchment of the Implied Private
Right ofAction
Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has consistently shown the
propensity to narrow available options for investors seeking civil
remedies using federal securities laws.7 7 The Court's actions have
included: shortening the statute of limitations, eliminating aiding and
abetting, restricting rescission claims, and heightening the reliance
standard.78
1. Shortening the Statute of Limitations
In Lampf v. Gilbertson,79 the Court imposed a uniform statute of
limitations to private securities actions that ended thirty years of lower
court practice, which had used forum state statutes of limitations. 80 In
Lampf the defendant helped form limited partnerships to purchase and
lease computer equipment.8 1 Between 1979 and 1981, the plaintiffs
invested in the partnerships with the expectation of receiving tax
benefits from their investments. 82 The investments subsequently failed,
the belief that Congress and the Supreme Court have been complicit in creating an environment
that does not hold corporate management accountable for their fraudulent actions against
investors).
77. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 174 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I respectfully dissent from the Court's continuing campaign to render
the private cause of action under §10(b) toothless."); see also Ramirez, supra note 65, at 1070
(describing the dismantling of private actions undertaken by the Supreme Court that goes back to
the early 1990s).
78. See infra Part II.E.1-4 (detailing four Supreme Court cases that have narrowed the scope
of the implied private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 and showing that each
plaintiff was denied a remedy to his or her injury due to the narrowing of the scope of private
action).
79. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
80. See Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative
Developments Affecting the Private Securities FraudClass Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV 1003, 1007

(1998) (noting that the decision in Lampf came as a surprise because the question addressed by
the Court was not raised by the certiorari petition and the decision reflected "an undercurrent of
judicial dissatisfaction" with the state of private securities fraud actions).
81. Lampf 501 U.S. at 352. The investments in this case are known as tax shelters, which
were/are a popular means of reducing tax liability. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1601 (9th ed.

2009) (defining a tax shelter as a "financial operation or investment strategy (such as a
partnership or real-estate investment trust) that is created primarily for the purpose of reducing or
deferring income-tax payments" and explaining that "[t]he Tax Reform Act of 1986-by
restricting the deductibility of passive losses-sharply limited the effectiveness of shelters").
82. Lampf 501 U.S. at 352; see also George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax
Shelters: Taking a Lesson From History, 54 SMU L. REv. 209, 210-12 (2001) (discussing the

growth of tax shelter activity from 1975-1986 using business structures such as partnerships, S
corporations, limited partnerships, and LLCs). An essential goal of a tax shelter is creating a
large amount of net losses for the owners of the enterprise compared to net income. Id. at 211.
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and in late 1982 and early 1983, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
notified the plaintiffs that the limited partnerships were being
investigated. 83 In 1985, the IRS disallowed the tax benefits that the
plaintiffs claimed on their tax returns. 84 The defendant law firm, one of
several defendants, had helped create the partnerships and prepared
opinion letters regarding the anticipated tax consequences of the
investments.85 The plaintiff investors filed suit in November 1986 and
June 1987 alleging they were misled into investing in the partnerships
by misrepresentations made in offering materials and documents,
including misrepresentations about the tax consequences.8 6
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted
the defendant's request for summary judgment based on a failure to
meet the statute of limitations by applying the limitations period of two
years taken from the "most analogous" forum, in this case, Oregon.87
The district court used "inquiry notice" to begin tolling, holding that
1982 was the time when the plaintiffs received notice from the IRS of
an investigation into the partnerships.8 8 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that an issue of material fact existed as to when the plaintiffs
actually learned about the fraud, but agreeing with the use of the forum
83. Lampf 501 U.S. at 352; see also Yin, supra note 82, at 214 (stating that during the 1970s
and 1980s, curbing the use of tax shelters was a priority for all three branches of government).
84. Lampf 501 U.S. at 352; see also Yin, supra note 82, at 217 (discussing methods, such as
congressional acts in the 1980s, of preventing taxpayers from engaging in tax avoidance schemes
by making the cost of doing so greater than the potential reward).
85. Lampf 501 U.S. at 353; see also Jack Townsend, The Role of the Taxpayer'sIndependent
Lawyer in Tax Shelter Promotions with Promoter Opinions (10/8/11), FED. TAX CRIMES BLOG

(Oct. 8, 2011, 12:11 PM), http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/2011/10/role-of-taxpayersindependent-lawyer-in.html ("The typical pattern for [tax shelter] transactions is that the
taxpayers . . . were wealthy and engaged their own independent tax counsel with respect to the
shelters rather than just rely upon the attorney tax opinions arranged or delivered by the
promoters. Those independent tax counsel were often prominent and experienced tax
attorneys.").
86. Lampf 501 U.S. at 352-53; see also Townsend, supra note 85 (describing a recent case in
the Northern District Court of California where the court penalized the taxpayer for entering into
a tax shelter that he was sophisticated enough to know was too good to be true when he entered
into a transaction that resulted in a $315.7 million tax basis for a $0.9 million offsetting options
transaction).
87. Lampf 501 U.S. at 353; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining statute of limitations as "[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a
statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued
(as when the injury occurred or was discovered)").
88. Lampf 501 U.S. at 353; see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1797
(2010) (defining inquiry notice as existing when "the victim is aware of facts that would lead a
reasonable person to investigate and consequently acquire actual knowledge of the defendant's
misrepresentations" (quoting Great Rivers Coop. of Se. Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 120 F.3d
893, 896 (8th Cir. 1997))).
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state limitations period.89 This reversal gave the plaintiffs the
opportunity to plead their case within the Oregon limitations period.90
The Supreme Court reversed again, holding that the statute of
origin-i.e., the 1934 Act-should guide the limitations period when a
claim is asserted under an implied cause of action arising under that
statute. 91 The Lampf Court held that the statute of limitations applicable
to causes of action that arise under § 10(b) must be one year after
discovery of the cause of action and a repose period within three years
of the violation.92 These limitations and repose periods were the
original periods drafted into the 1934 Act and applied to those causes of
action that were expressly created by the Act.93 Thus, the Court
reasoned that the same limitations and repose periods should also apply
to those causes of action implicitly created by the 1934 Act.94 The
Court also applied this new rule retroactively to the plaintiffs, barring
them from a remedy despite the fact that they were entrenched in
89. Lampf 501 U.S. at 354; see also Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, SEC Rule
10b-5 and Its New Statute of Limitations: The Circuits Defy the Supreme Court, 51 BUS. LAW.

309, 310 (1996) (stating that prior to Lampf, federal courts followed the well-established practice
of borrowing the forum state's statute of limitations from the state cause of action most applicable
to an implied federal claim under Rule 1Ob-5).
90. Lampf 501 U.S. at 354.
91. See Lampf 501 U.S. at 359 (stating that the uniform federal period that is indicated in the
express causes of action under the 1933 and 1934 Acts provides the source for guidance in the
implied right of action context); see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 89, at 310 (stating
that with the adoption of a uniform federal statute of limitations for implied private actions under
Rule lOb-5, the Court looked at limitations periods provided by Congress for express civil
liability provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts).
92. Lampf 501 U.S. at 360-61. In 2002, Congress explicitly modified the holding in Lampf
favoring those bringing private securities actions. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745, 801 (2002) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2000 & Supp.
IV 2004)).
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right of action that involves a claim of
fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement
concerning the securities laws, as defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)), may be brought not later than the earlier
of(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or
(2) 5 years after such violation

Id. (emphasis added); see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 89, at 313 (discussing the
Court's decision to fashion its new rule after § 9(e) of the 1934 Act rather than § 13 of the 1933
Act, thereby opting for an "actual notice" requirement rather than an "inquiry notice" requirement
used by the district court).
93. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359-60. Note, however, that the Court rejected the contention that the
five-year limitations period contained in § 20 was more appropriate for § 10(b) actions. Id. at
361. This limitations period was added in 1988 and applied to remedies for insider trading, but
not § 10(b) fraud. Id.
94. Id. at 361.
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litigation for four-and-a-half years. 95 The Court's adoption of inquiry
notice drew criticism from scholars who argued that, sometimes,
victims of securities fraud do not have actual knowledge of the fraud
until well after they are notified of potential wrongdoing. 96
2. Elimination of Aiding and Abetting
In Central Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank, NA., 97 the

Court abolished any private right of action against aiding and abetting
violations under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.98 The case concerned the
issuance of $26 million in bonds by a public authority in Colorado
where the defendant, Central Bank of Denver, filled the role of
indenture trustee. 99 The plaintiffs, including First Interstate Bank of
95. Lampf 501 U.S. at 369 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated:
[T]o apply the new limitation period in this case . . . respondents' suit is time barred
under a limitations period that did not exist before today, the Court departs drastically
from our established practice and inflicts an injustice on the respondents. The Court
declines to explain its unprecedented decision, or even to acknowledge its unusual
character.
Id.; see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 89, at 311 (stating that since the plaintiffs in
Lampf filed their complaints more than three years after the alleged misrepresentations, their
claims were time-barred).
96. See Walker & Seymour, supra note 80, at 1009 (stating that after Lampf the trigger for the
running of the one-year prong of the statute of limitations was the most frequently litigated issue
in private securities fraud cases). Courts were split on whether tolling began at "inquiry notice"
or "constructive notice" of the fraud. Id. As a result of courts using inquiry notice, a plaintiff can
be barred from remedy if he learns about the actual basis for the cause of action one year after she
should have suspected as much. Id; see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 89, at 333-34
(opting for the "actual notice" standard rather than "inquiry notice," and claiming that "actual
notice" gives plaintiffs a longer limitations period and may serve to balance the short three-year
statute of repose, which has drawn criticism in debates concerning amendments to federal
securities laws).
97. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994),
superseded in part by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2006), as recognized in Doe v. Exxon Mobile
Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
98. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority did away with a long history of
aider and abettor liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and that "[i]n hundreds of judicial and
administrative proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have
concluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5"); see also
David A. Lipton, Private Aiding and Abetting Claims Under Section 10(b), in 15A BROKER-

DEALER REGULATION § 5:31 (2011) (asserting that the demise of the aiding and abetting claim
for private parties under § 10(b) has made it more critical to be able to distinguish between
primary and secondary liability when bringing a private cause of action).
99.

Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167; see also Bond Trustee Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM,

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bond-trustee.asp#axzzlcOg4wZXs (last visited Apr. 21,
2012). A bond trustee is defined as
[a] financial institution with trust powers, such as a commercial bank or trust company,
that is given fiduciary powers by a bond issuer to enforce the terms of a bond
indenture. An indenture is a contract between a bond issuer and a bond holder. A
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Denver, had purchased $2.1 million of the bonds.100 Subsequently, the
public authority defaulted, and the plaintiffs sued a list of actors,
including the defendant, for a violation of § 10(b).10 1 The plaintiffs
claimed the defendant had actual knowledge that the land appraisal
securing the bonds may have been overvalued, and despite this
knowledge, it failed to complete an independent appraisal review until
after the default.10 2 The plaintiffs further argued that the defendant was
secondarily liable for aiding and abetting the fraudulent violation of
securities laws. 103
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, but the Tenth Circuit
reversed. 1 04 Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the language
in § 10(b) was silent on aiding and abetting and noted that "the text of
the statute controls our decision." 0 5 Reversing the appellate court's
trustee sees that bond interest payments are made as scheduled, and protects the
interests of the bondholders if the issuer defaults.
Id.

100. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 168. In this case, the bonds in question were municipal bonds.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 204 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a municipal bond as "[a] bond
issued by a nonfederal government or governmental unit, such as a state bond to finance local
improvements" and stating that "[t]he interest received from a municipal bond may be exempt
from federal, state, and local taxes").
101. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 168.
102. Id at 167-68; see also Junbo Wang, Chunchi Wu & Frank Zhang, Liquidity, Default,
Taxes and Yields on Municipal Bonds 4 (Fed. Res. Bd., Div. of Res. & Stat. & Monetary Aff.,
Working Paper No. 2005-35), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2005/
200535/200535pap.pdf (noting that while municipal bonds have traditionally been considered the
safest investment next to U.S. treasuries, there is evidence of municipal default since the late
1970s; in a survey of municipal bond issuance between 1977 and 1998, 1,765 out of a total of
253,850 (0.69%) issues were defaulted, with a face value of $24.9 billion out of a total of $375.5
billion).
103. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 168. Plaintiffs sued the public authority, the 1988 underwriter, a
junior underwriter, an AmWest Development director, and Central Bank for violations of § 10(b)
-the first three as primarily liable and Central Bank as secondarily liable. Id.; see also Daniel R.
Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the SecuritiesAct of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV.

80, 80 n.4 (1981) (defining secondary liability as "the judicially implied civil liability which has
been imposed on defendants who have not themselves been held to have violated the express
prohibition of the securities statute at issue, but who have some relationship with the primary
wrongdoer").
104. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 168 (explaining that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth
the elements of aiding and abetting under § 10(b) as including: "(1) a primary violation of §
10(b); (2) recklessness by the aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary violation; and
(3) substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor"); see also Simon
Lorne, Comment on "JustDessertsfor Accountants, " 38 ARIz. L. REv. 555, 557 (1996) (stating

that the Court granted certiorari in Central Bank on the question of the level of scienter necessary
in an aiding and abetting context).
105.

Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 173; see also Gary L. Goodenow, Litigating the SEC's Ancillary
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decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that § 10(b) did not proscribe
aiding and abetting violations and refused to accept the argument that
the terms "directly and indirectly" in the section referred to aiding and
abetting. 106 The dissent asserted that, in an apparent showing ofjudicial
activism, the majority addressed a § 10(b) question that was not
contemplated-and in fact, conceded-by the defendant in its petition
for certiorari. 107
3. Restriction of Rescission Claims10 8
In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 109 the Supreme Court limited the right of

rescission for victims of securities fraud to only those cases that arise
with respect to public offerings of securities by an issuer that issues a
prospectus as described in § 10(b).110 In Gustafson, the defendants sold
their interest in stock of Alloyd Co., Inc. to the plaintiffs.'11 While
researching the company and its financial statements, the plaintiffs
discovered that the defendants had merely estimated the company's
Enforcement Remedies Following Central Bank and Its Progeny, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 67, 78

(1997) (asserting that following the Court's strict adherence to the text of § 10(b) would prohibit
the SEC from having any ancillary remedies in issues of securities statute interpretation).
106. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176; see also Goodenow, supra note 105, at 78 (noting that §
10(b) does not state that the SEC can sue for injunctive relief per se; therefore, it should not be
allowed to use inherent equitable powers such as disgorgement, receivers, and accountings, which
are ancillary remedies available to the SEC but not stated in the statute).
107. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 194-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("But instead of simply
addressing the questions presented by the parties, on which the law was unsettled, the Court sua
sponte directed the parties to address a question on which even the petitioner justifiably thought
the law was settled, and reaches out to overturn a most considerable body of precedent."). See
generally Melissa C. Nunziato, Comment, Aiding and Abetting, A Madoff Family Affair: Why
Secondary Actors Should be Held Accountablefor Securities Fraud Through the Restoration of
the PrivateRight ofAction for Aiding andAbetting Liability Under the FederalSecurities Laws,

73 ALB. L. REv. 603 (2010) (arguing that Congress should restore the private right of action
against those who aid and abet securities fraud, and that in the wake of the Bernie Madoff Ponzi
scheme, not doing so would perpetuate further fraudulent conduct in the market and impede
investor confidence).
108. Although the restriction of claims pertains to § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77b (2006), it is added to this Note because it follows a pattern ofjudicial retrenchment
of the private right of action under federal securities laws.
109. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
110. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 578. The Court stated that it was not plausible to infer that
Congress created the right to rescind for every casual communication between buyer and seller.
Id. Congress meant to only allow rescission for claims arising from communications contained in
a prospectus or other registered statement. Id.; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act
Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 Bus. LAW. 1231, 1231-32 (1995) (strongly
criticizing the Court's decision, calling it "the most poorly-reasoned, blatantly results-driven
securities opinion in recent memory").
111. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 564. The transaction involved in this case was a private
transaction, meaning it was not executed on a public exchange. Id.
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inventory in preparation of filing financial statements instead of
accurately stating it.1 12 Despite that knowledge, the plaintiffs elected
not to conduct a physical inspection of the inventory and settled for the
defendants' representation that the financial statements were an accurate
and complete assessment of the company's financial condition.113 The
parties indicated in their Stock Purchase Agreement that the purchase
price would be adjusted to take account of any variance between
estimates in the statements and actual amounts found in a year-end
audit. 114 Although the audit uncovered a substantial inventory shortfall
that the defendants agreed to make whole, the plaintiffs later sought
rescission of the entire deal under fraud claims governed by § 12(2) of
the 1933 Act, which gives buyers an express right of rescission against
sellers that make material misstatements or omissions in a
prospectus.1 15
112.

Id; see also CHARLES J. JOHNSON & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND

THE SECURITIES LAWS § 5.03, at 5-31 (4th ed. 2008) (describing the due diligence process as
verifying the premises underlying the transaction and as a means to minimize financial loss to the
investor).
113. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 565; see also JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 112, § 5.03,
at 5-31 (asserting that effective due diligence cannot take place if the persons conducting the
process are in the dark about the factors relating to the transaction).
114. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 565; see also Definition of Stock Purchase Agreement,
BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/stock-purchaseagreement.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). A stock purchase agreement is defined as an
[a]greement between a closely-held or private firm and its shareholders for regulating
the sale and transfer of firm's shares. It covers items such as who has the right of first
refusal, and provides a mechanism for the purchase (redemption) of the shares of the
shareholder who becomes bankrupt, is discharged, resigns, retires, becomes
incapacitated, or dies.

Id.
115. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 565; see also 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (2006).
(a) In general
Any person who(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of this title, or
(2) offers or sells a security . . . by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means
of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, . . . and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such
untruth or omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b) of this section, to the
person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity
in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the considerationpaidfor such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received hereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the Seventh Circuit
reversed. 116 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
Seventh Circuit and held that rescission liability"' under § 12(2) did
not apply to private or aftermarket securities transactions,
despite
existing precedent that suggested the Seventh Circuit's reading of
§ 12(2) was reasonable. 119 The majority opinion focused on the term
"prospectus," stating that under § 10(b), the term is confined to a
document contained in a registration statement, which, by and large, is
issued by an issuer of a security in an initial public offering. 120
4. Heightened Reliance Standard
In Stoneridge Investment Partners,LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,12 1 the

Court created the requirement of "a kind of super-causation" for
proving reliance. 122 The dispute in Stoneridge involved securities
116. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 566 (stating that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned that the "inclusion of the term 'communication' in the [19331 Act's definition of
prospectus meant that the term 'prospectus' was defined 'very broadly' to include all written
communications that offered the sale of a security"); see also BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1342
(9th ed. 2009) (defining a prospectus as a "printed document that describes the main features of
an enterprise and that is distributed to prospective buyers or investors" and explaining that
"[u]nder SEC regulations, a publicly traded corporation must provide a prospectus before offering
to sell stock in the corporation").
117. As used by the Court in this case, "rescission liability" means to "recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if [the purchaser] no longer owns the
security." § 771(a)(1)(2).
118. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 578; see also Brian Murray, Aftermarket Purchaser Standing
Under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 633, 637-38 (1999) (discussing
thirty years of pre-Gustafson case law and explaining that "purchasers in the secondary market
who can trace their stock back to an initial public offering . .. have standing to sue for violations
119. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979) (stating that while the 1933
Act was primarily concerned with regulating new issues, legislative history showed that Congress
intended to prohibit fraud, deception, and misrepresentation in the sale of securities that were new
offerings or secondary transactions).
120. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569; see also Peter V. Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 95, 152 (1996) (stating
that prior to Gustafson, § 12(2) was given a broad scope, and Gustafson radically altered the
vision of § 12(2) of the 1933 Act).
121. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
122. Id. at 168 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting two faulty premises on which the majority
opinion relied: (1) a broad interpretation of CentralBank, and (2) "the view that reliance requires
a kind of super-causation-a view contrary to both the [SEC] position . . . and our holding in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson"); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988) (holding
that the fraud-on-the-market theory can partly support a presumption of reliance, but the
presumption is rebuttable).
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violations made by Charter Communications, Inc., which was looking
to inflate its earnings to meet revenue projections previously reported to
the public.12 3 Charter offered two of its suppliers, Scientific-Atlanta
and Motorola-both defendants in the case-an additional twenty
dollars for each cable box Charter purchased from them, in exchange for
the two companies buying an equal amount of additional advertising
from Charter. 124 The defendants agreed, and Charter was able to meet
its earnings expectations.1 2 5 In conjunction with the scheme, Charter
filed financial statements with the SEC and reported the earnings to the
public.12 6 In the wake of Central Bank's holding that eliminated aiding
and abetting liability, the plaintiff proceeded with claims under § 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5, naming the defendants as primary violators. 1 27
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
dismissed the claims, holding that the defendants were vendors and
customers, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 128 The Supreme Court
123. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 153; see also Investor Resources, CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=112298&p=irol-irhome (last visited Apr. 21, 2012)
(noting that Charter Communications is one of the largest cable entertainment and broadband
communications companies, headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, and employees approximately
16,700 people).
124. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 154; see also Kevin P. Dwight et. al, FinancialInstitutions,
Professionals Breathe Sigh of Relief-Supreme Court Stonewalls Plaintifs' Attempt to Expand

Liabilityfor Securities Fraud in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc.,
MANATT, PHELPS, & PHILIPS, LLP, http://www.manatt.com/newsevents.aspx?id=5816 (last
visited Apr. 21, 2012) ("Charter agreed to purchase its cable boxes from Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola at inflated prices. In return, the suppliers agreed to use the extra money to buy
advertising from Charter, which capitalized its purchase of the boxes and recorded the suppliers'
advertising purchases as revenue, in violation of generally accepted accounting principles.").
125. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 154; see also Dwight, supra note 124 (stating that the scheme
worked and enabled Charter to report an additional $17 million in revenue for the year, which
allowed them to meet their financial estimates for 2000).
126. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 155; see also Sources for Corporate FinancialData, UNIV.

LIBRARY SYS., UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH, http://www.library.pitt.edu/guidesbusiness/financials.
html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (discussing the SEC requirement that companies selling stock to
the public must file a number of reports with the SEC as a means of informing investors about the
company).
127. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 155; see also Nicholas F. Schanbaum, Note, Scheme Liability:
Rule IOb-5(A) and Secondary Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26 REV. LITIG. 183, 187 (2007)

(discussing § 10(b) as prohibiting deceptive and manipulative conduct connected with the
purchase or sale of a security, and Rule lOb-5 as specifically delineating the types of conduct
barred by § 10(b)). Schanbaum asserted that after Central Bank, plaintiffs had to position what
would have been a secondary violation for aiding and abetting as a primary violation of Rule lOb5. Id at 185.
128. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156 (noting that there was a conflict among the courts of appeals
"respecting when, if ever, an injured investor may rely upon § 10(b) to recover from a party that
neither makes a public misstatement nor violates a duty to disclose but does participate in a
scheme to violate § 10(b)"); see also Prentice, supra note 36, at 353 (noting that the Court in
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determined that the key issue under review was whether "any deceptive
statement or act [on the part of the defendants had] the requisite
proximate relation to the investors' harm."1 29 The Court held that no
member of the investing public relied on, or had knowledge of, any act
performed by the defendants and reasoned that this indirect chain of
events was too remote from the investors to attach liability. 130 The
dissent argued that the majority misapplied the holding in Central Bank
and that its decision soundly weakened the implied private right of

action under § 10(b). 13 1
Blue Chip, Lampf Central Bank, Gustafson, Tellabs, and Stoneridge

all showcase the Supreme Court's systemic narrowingl 32 of a plaintiffs
Stoneridge primarily evaluated the validity of "scheme liability" under subsection (a) of Rule
1Ob-5).
129. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158-59; see also Prentice, supra note 36, at 361-62 (asserting
that it is extremely likely that Congress intended for the SEC to outlaw "both schemes to defraud
and fraudulent courses of business" when it enacted the 1934 Act).
130. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159. Additionally, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs "scheme
liability" argument, which alleged that the defendants' conduct had the purpose and effect of
creating a false appearance of material fact to further a scheme to misrepresent Charter's revenue.
Id at 160. The Court explained that such a holding would "reach the whole marketplace in which
the issuing company does business." Id; see also Daniel A. McLaughlin, Liability Under Rules
10b-5(a) & (c), 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 631, 631 (2006) (describing scheme liability as involving a
"defendant [who] neither spoke nor owed a duty to speak but instead engaged in business
transactions that were misreported by the issuer"); Prentice, supra note 36, at 393 ("[T]he
Stoneridge majority revised approximately four hundred years of fraud law by creating . . . an

artificial dichotomy between primary and secondary liability. The majority opinion may also
have rewritten a couple of hundred years' worth of fraud jurisprudence regarding the reliance
element by arguably holding that those who knowingly and actively participate in a fraud may
avoid liability by simply staying in the shadows." (emphasis added)).

131. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 168-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
failed to realize that this case was different from CentralBank because in that case, the bank did
not engage in any deceptive acts and it did not itself violate § 10(b), but that respondents in this
case directly produced documents and signed contracts-"deceptive devices"- to perpetuate a
fraud); see also Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994), superseded in part by statute, 15 U.S.C.

§

78t (2006), as recognized in Doe v. Exxon

Mobile Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
The absence of §10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors
in the securities markets are always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any
person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative
device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller
of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under lOb-5, assuming all of the
requirements for primary liability under Rule lob-5 are met.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation With Securities Fraud,61 ALA.

L. REv. 61, 89 (2009) (stating that the Stoneridge decision did not create a "blanket rule rejecting
assertions of fraud-on-the-market in every situation where defendants' involvement in the fraud
was nonpublic," but instead, gives rise to the notion that reliance is a factual determination that
emphasizes the proximity to the fraud).
132. The Court also narrowed the scope of § 10(b) in another case not specifically covered in
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options when seeking recourse for securities fraud under federal
securities laws. 133 Each case resulted in some form of investor injury
that escaped liability under the Court's interpretation of § 10(b) and
other sections of federal securities laws such as § 12(2) of the 1933
Act. 134 This progeny of case law deviates from the intended purpose of
securities regulation within the private context.135 Janus only furthered
that deviation. 136
Although Stoneridge left the question of what constitutes primary and
secondary liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 unanswered,137
commentators speculated that the Court would use the opportunity
presented by Janus to define a balanced and appropriate standard.' 38
Interestingly, the Court's track record with private action litigation
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 (i.e., the narrowing of plaintiffs' rights)
should have made the Court's decision in Janus highly predictable.1 39
this Note. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that a private
cause of action for negligence will not lie under Rule lOb-5 in the absence of any allegation of
scienter).
133. See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet:A Descriptionof the Arduous, and Now
Often Fatal,Journeyfor Plaintifs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 6
(1996-1997) (stating that in the mid-70s the Supreme Court decided thirty-two out of forty
federal securities law cases for the defendants, and in almost every one of these cases, the Court
narrowed the utility of federal securities laws); see also Goodenow, supra note 105, at 79
(asserting that there is little doubt the Supreme Court is under a trend of restricting the scope of
federal securities laws).
134. See supra Part II.E.1-4 (detailing the factual background of each case discussed in this
background).
135. See Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract: The Trojan Horse of Rule 10b-5, 51
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 879, 880 (1994) (asserting that the 1934 Act was enacted as a means to
end the "philosophy of caveat emptor" or "buyer beware").
136. See James D. Redwood, To Make or to Mar: The Supreme Court Turns Away Another
Securities Law Plaintiff 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1942558 (asserting that the Court in Janus, "following a
disturbing recent trend, has voluntarily chosen to bar the gates to securities plaintiffs") (footnote
omitted).
137. See Colombo, supra note 131, at 89 (stating that the question still exists as to what the
distinction would be between conduct classified as aiding and abetting and conduct classified as a
primary violation by a secondary actor).
138. See Bruce D. Angiolillo & Jonathan K. Youngwood, The Janus Debate: The Supreme
Court May Clarify The Boundaries of Secondary Actor Liability Under § 10(b), 8 SEC. LITIG.
REP. 1, 1 (2010) (discussing the briefs and oral arguments in Janus and the potential outcome of
the case). The Fourth Circuit widened a circuit split when it found for plaintiffs, holding that an
investment adviser to a mutual fund could be held primarily liable under § 10(b). Id. The
Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits found that only statements that are publicly made could
create primary attribution and liability. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, has used substantial
participation or intricate involvement in preparation of the misleading statement to find liability.
Id.
139. See Thomas A. Smith, Betting on Supreme Court Outcomes, RATIO JURiS BLOG (Sept.
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III. DISCUSSION

Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders was argued
before the Supreme Court on December 7, 2010.140 Prior to the Court's
decision on June 13, 2011, analysts believed the case would have farreaching implications for the mutual fund industry, as well as collateral
actors such as lawyers and accountants. 14 1 But Janus was years in the
making, and, as this Note posits, the ramifications of its holding could
end up reaching beyond these analysts' initial expectations.14 2
A. FactualBackground of the Case
In September 2003, the New York Attorney General filed a
complaint alleging that Janus Capital Group Inc. ("JCG") and Janus
Capital Management LLC ("JCM") entered into secret arrangements
with certain hedge fund investors to allow market-timing 4 3 transactions
11, 2006, 8:44 PM), http://ratiojuris.blogspot.com/2006/09/betting-on-supreme-court-outcomes
.html (discussing the Washington Stock Exchange, which allows traders to bet on the outcome of
future events, including the outcomes of U.S. Supreme Court decisions); see also Catherine
Rampell, Supreme Court Betting, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2009, 1:28 PM), http://economix
.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/supreme-court-betting/ (discussing "Intrade.com," an online
prediction market that was taking bets on who would be the eventual replacement for Justice
David Souter).
140. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
141. See Angiolillo & Youngwood, supra note 138 (discussing the anticipated affect the
Court's decision would have on the understanding of primary and secondary liability under §
10(b)).
142. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd,Janus Capital Grp.,
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). The original complaint for this case was
filed in November 2003 by an individual investor, Craig Wiggins, in a Colorado federal court, but
it was later moved to Maryland to be joined together with similar complaints and First Derivative
Traders was appointed as lead plaintiff. Id. For a discussion of the unforeseen potential
consequences of the Court's decision in Janus, see infra Part V.
143. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300 n. 1. The Court describes market timing as
[a] trading strategy that exploits time delay in mutual funds' daily valuation system.
The price for buying or selling shares of a mutual fund is ordinarily determined by the
next net asset value (NAV) calculation after the order is placed. The NAV calculation
usually happens once a day, at the close of the major U.S. markets. Because of certain
time delays, however, the values used in these calculations do not always accurately
reflect the true value of the underlying assets. For example, a fund may value its
foreign securities based on the price at the close of the foreign market that could be
expected to affect their price. If the event were expected to increase the price of the
foreign securities, a market-timing investor could buy shares of a mutual fund at the
artificially low NAV and sell the next day when the NAV corrects itself upward.
Id.; see also Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87

B.U. L. REv. 1021, 1041 (2007) (citing studies indicating that market timing reduces the returns
of non-timing investors); James J. Park, Rule 1OB-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment

Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 380 (2010) (describing the act of market timing as harmful to
mutual fund investors because of the increase in transaction costs to the fund-borne by all
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in exchange for investing "sticky assets"144 in Janus Investment Funds
("Janus Funds"). 145 JCG was a publicly traded company that wholly
owned (and still owns) JCM as a subsidiary. 14 6 Ninety percent of
JCG's revenue was derived from JCM's activities, and the two entities
had extensive overlap in executive officers due to JCM's position as
JCG's primary operating company. 147 The Janus Funds were a
Massachusetts business trust established for the sole purpose of holding
the Janus family of funds. 14 8 Although the trust was created by JCG, it
was a separate legal entity owned entirely by its mutual fund investors
and had its own board of trustees. 14 9 The Janus Funds had no assets
apart from what it held for mutual fund shareholders, and all officers of

investors of the mutual fund-that are generated by the frequent trading).
144. See SEC v. Treadway, 430 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing a
scheme in which a mutual fund gave a hedge fund "market timing privileges in certain PIMCO
funds in exchange for long-term or 'sticky asset' investments in other PIMCO funds"); see also
Adam Shell, Anatomy of a Tricky Trading Scheme, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2003, 12:03 AM),

http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfil/funds/2003-09-05-trading-schemex.htm (defining "sticky
assets" as "money that is invested in a fund for a long period of time and generates fees for a fund
company").
145. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300; see also Shell, supra note 144 ("[M]arket timing hurts longterm shareholders by diluting their returns and resulting in higher trading costs. A fund's
performance may also be hurt by the fact that fund managers must hold more cash to meet the
redemptions caused by the timers' trades.").
146. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 394, 1565 (9th ed. 2009)

(defining a subsidiary corporation as one "in which a parent corporation has a controlling share"
and further defining subsidiary as "[s]ubordinate; under another's control"); Dick Weil & Bruce
Koepfgen, Third Quarter2011 Earnings Presentation,JANUS CAPITAL GRP. 26 (Oct. 20, 2011),

http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/JANUS/0x0x510109/ld5bldde-e722-4cbO-bbec- 13292e
5adel/3Ql 1 Earnings Presentation_-_FINAL 10.19.11_.pdf (disclosing that JCG provides
investment advisory services through three primary subsidiaries: JCM; INTECH Investment
Management LLC; and Perkins Investment Management LLC).
147. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
148.

Id; see also John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument

of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 183-84 (1997) (asserting that many mutual funds have chosen
to organize as a trust because it eliminates a layer of regulation, namely state corporation
statutes); Definition of Business Trust, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM,

http://www.business

dictionary.com/definition/business-trust.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) ("[A business trust is a]
commercial organization managed by appointed trustees (who hold the title to the business'
property) for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries. A business trust is treated as a legal entity
by the tax authorities and must have (1) a business purpose, and (2) must function as a
business."). Trusts also have the flexibility to eliminate corporate governance procedures that are
obligatory under the corporate form. Id.
149. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299; see also Langbein,supra note 148, at 184 (noting that a mutual
fund established as a business trust does not have to hold routine shareholder meetings, thereby
eliminating the costs of proxy solicitation and other meeting-related expenses associated with
corporations).
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the Janus Funds were officers of JCM. 50 Moreover, a member of the
Janus Funds' board was an officer of both JCG and JCM.I1
The Janus Funds retained JCM as investment advisor that would be
in charge of the day-to-day management of the funds, including
furnishing investment advice and recommendations, buying and selling
securities, handling investor requests and inquiries, and providing
general administrative, compliance, and accounting services for the
funds. 152 Moreover, JCM helped create and disseminate the prospectus
for the Janus Funds and made it available to the public through the
website it shared with JCG. 15 3 For all intents and purposes, JCM ran
the Janus Funds. 154 In exchange for these services, JCM received
management fees based primarily on the amount of assets under
management.155 Therefore, the more assets JCM managed for the Janus
Funds, the more revenue it generated for JCG.15 6 Conversely, a drop in
150. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
151. See Brief for Respondent at 4, Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.
Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4253501 at *4 (stating that the Janus Funds' Board of
Trustees was chaired by the founder and former CEO of JCG, Thomas Bailey, and that every one
of the Janus Funds' seventeen officers was a V.P. at JCM); see also In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig.,
566 F.3d 111, 131 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131
S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (describing the entwinement of one officer in particular, Helen Hayes, who
was a director of both JCG and JCM during the class period and a managing director of
investments and a portfolio manager at JCM).
152. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Howard Schiffman, The
Relationship Between the Investment Advisor and the Mutual Fund: Too Closefor Comfort, 45

FORDHAM L. REv. 183, 183 (1976) (asserting that while the fund and its advisor are two separate
legal entities, the conflicts of interest inherent in this relationship are obvious and have led to
commentators describing the relationship as anomalous and incestuous).
153. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 116.
154. Id. at 115; see also INv. Co. INST., 2011 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK (51st ed.
2011), availableat http://www.ici.orglpdf/201 1 factbook.pdf (noting that unlike other companies
or industries, a mutual fund is typically managed by an external party and relies on the third party
advisor to invest fund assets and carry out other business activities).
155. All mutual funds charge management fees based on assets under management. J.
STODDARD HAYES, JR., ESTATE TAX & PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING

§

30:49 (2012),

available at Westlaw 3 Est. Tax & Pers. Fin. Plan. § 30:49. For example, a $100 million fund
may charge one percent annually for managing the fund. This generally means that at the end of
every quarter (typically March, June, September, and December), the fund takes a snapshot of the
assets in the fund and charges the fee. For instance, if the fund is worth $105 million at the end
of March, one percent of that amount is $1,050,000 and divided by four would be $262,500.
Therefore, the investment advisor will assess a fee of $262,500 for that three-month period. The
money will be directly withdrawn from the cash balance of the mutual fund and paid to the
investment advisor. Note that since the investment advisor controls all of the day-to-day
operations of the fund, the advisors essentially pay themselves.
156. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300. If a mutual fund advisor has $105 million of assets under
management and charges a one percent annual fee, then the advisor will earn $1,050,000 for the
year assuming the assets do not go up or down. If during the next year the advisor's assets under
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the value of the assets under management resulted in a drop in the
revenue JCM provided to JCG.15 7
The central issue in Janus revolved around statements that were made
in the Janus Funds' prospectuses filed with the SEC, and then made
available to the public through the Janus corporate website. 158 The
warning against market-timing activity in the prospectus was not simple
boilerplate language typically lost in the midst of a large legal
document. 15 9 Instead, the evidence indicated that JCG and JCM
employees/officers were well aware that the Janus Funds did not
support or allow market timing as was stated in the prospectus. 160
management increase to $120 million, the percentage stays the same at one percent, but the
advisor will now earn $1.2 million because of the higher asset pool that is being managed.
157. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 118 (noting that after the Attorney General's
complaint became public, there was a massive exodus of mutual fund investors causing a
decrease in assets under management of JCM of $14 billion in a roughly six month period); see
also Brief for Respondent, supra note 151, at 5 (stating that in SEC filings made by JCG, the
company identified the number one risk to its business as "[a]ny decrease in the value of Janus'
assets under management," which would negatively affect revenues and profits).
158. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 116-17. The anti-market-timing policy listed in
the prospectus of the Janus Mercury Fund states:
Frequent trades in your account or accounts controlled by you can disrupt portfolio
investment strategies and increase Fund expenses for all Fund shareholders. The fund
is not intendedfor market timing or excessive trading. To deter these activities, the

Fund or its agent may temporarily or permanently suspend or terminate exchange
privileges of any investor who makes more than four exchanges out of the Fund in a
calendar year and bar future purchases into the Fund by such investor. In addition, the
Fund or its agent also may reject any purchase orders (including exchange purchases)
by any investor or group of investors indefinitely for any reason, including, in
particular, purchase orders that they believe are attributable to market timers or are
otherwise excessive or potentially disruptive to the Fund.
Orders placed by an investor in violation of the exchange limits or the excessive
trading policies or by investors that the Fund believes are market timers may be
revoked or cancelled by the Fund ....
Id.

(emphasis added); see also The Mutual Fund Prospectus, supra note 153 (noting that a

prospectus is usually one hundred-plus pages long and most of the information included is
statutorily required).
159. See Ollivette E. Mencer, Unclear Consequences: The Ambient Ambiguity, 22 S.U. L.

REv. 217, 217 (1995) (asserting that legal writing, in general, is not good, and leads to millions of
dollars of needless expenses and a loss of respect for the legal profession).
160. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 118 (quoting two internal emails by Janus
employees). One employee stated:
Our stated policy is that we do not tolerate timers. As such, we won't actively seek
timers, but when pressed and when we believe allowing a limited/controlled amount of
timing activity will be in JCG's best interests (increased profitability to the firm) we

will make exceptions under these parameters.
Id. (emphasis added). Another employee added:
My own personal recommendation is not to allow timing, period, and follow the
prospectus . . . . [T]imers often hide multiple accounts and move on the same day
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Some employees voiced their concerns about allowing these
transactions to continue due to the negative impact they had on portfolio
managers and investors, namely, market-timing increases fund fees paid
by all mutual fund investors and hampers the portfolio manager's
trading ability.161 One such employee repeated the prospectuses'
warning but nevertheless suggested that allowing a limited amount of
market timing would be in JCG's best interest because it would lead to
increased profitability.16 2 Another employee suggested that the Janus
Funds maintain the market-timing agreements they presently had but to
not allow any future agreements.1 63
On September 3, 2003, the New York Attorney General filed its
complaint.164 By the end of the month, JCG shareholders lost twentythree percent of their investment.165 The assets held inside Janus Funds
which couldhurt other investors and enrage the [portfolio managers] ....

I don't think

the static assets that we might be able to hold onto are worth the potential headaches,
nor does this fall into our 'narrow and deep' focus. I suggest we maintain the timing
agreements we have, but allow no more.
Id. (emphasis added). It is difficult to understand how JCM/JCG escaped primary liability in the
face of this type of evidence that showcased clear control over the alleged market-timing activity
and the knowledge of the affects it had on the company as a whole and, by extension, to the
shareholders. See infra Part IV.C (exploring the "ultimate control" of statements and the Court's
position in Janus).
161. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 117 (quoting an email from "a concerned
[JCG] employee" to the CEO of Janus International Growth Fund). The employee stated:
I'm getting more concerned w/ all of these market timers and how they are affecting
our PM's [i.e., Portfolio Managers] trading activity. [Portfolio Managers] have voiced
their sensitivity on a number of occasions re: this type of activity in JWF. I spoke to [a
Janus employee] and confirmed that this is a big problem domestically and I want to
avoid this at all cost before it gets too problematic offshore. Now that we have our
exchange limitation in our prospectus, I would feel more comfortable not accepting
this type of business because it's too difficult to monitor/enforce & it is very disruptive
to the PM's & operation of the funds. Obviously, your call from the sales side.
Id. (footnote omitted).
162. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (quoting employee emails).
163. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (quoting employee emails).
164. See Amey Stone, Can Janus Save Face?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 9, 2003),

http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2003/nf2003099_2044dbO4.htm (discussing
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's probe against Janus and four other mutual fund
companies that allegedly gave a hedge fund (Canary Capital) special privileges in trading fund
shares, which harmed returns for long-term mutual fund shareholders while benefiting the parent
company); see also JanusAnnounces New Measures Following Spitzer Pro, ADVISORONE (Sept.

10, 2003), http://www.advisorone.com/2003/09/10/janus-announces-new-measures-followingspitzer-pro (noting that five days after the complaint was filed, JCG told fund shareholders who
may have been adversely impacted by market-timing that it would reimburse them of losses).
165. See Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2300 (2011)
("JCG's stock price fell nearly 25 percent, from $17.68 on September 2 to $13.50 on September
26."); see also Stone, supra note 164 (adding that JCG stockholders were in good spirits leading
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fell by $14 billion within six months, which affected future earnings.166
Shareholders of JCG filed a class action suit naming both JCG and JCM
as defendants.1 6 7 The shareholders asserted that JCG and JCM violated
§ 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, and they also brought a "control person" claim
against JCG under § 20(a) of the 1934 Act. 1 68 The defendants moved to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.' 69
B. The DistrictCourt's Decision
In granting the motion to dismiss, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland held that even though the mutual fund
prospectuses bore JCM's name and logo and were available on its
website, these facts alone did not make JCM liable to JCG's
shareholders for misrepresentations made in the prospectuses.17 0 The
court found that the nexus between JCM and JCG shareholders was too
"tenuous" to allow liability. 17 1 It differentiated a prior and separate
action brought by the Janus mutual fund investors against JCG and
JCM, where the court denied a similar motion to dismiss. 172 In that
case, the district court noted that JCG and JCM had made
misrepresentations in a fraudulent "scheme" that resulted in a direct
up to the complaint because the company was in the midst of recovering from the bear market of
the recent past and JCG's stock had gone from $10 in March to $19 by mid-July; however, in the
two days following the filing of the complaint, JCG stock fell from $18 to $15.50).
166. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 118 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd,Janus Capital Grp.,
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). Mutual fund shareholders do not like to
see news that questions the ethical stature of those who are managing their money. Any news
that implicates a manager's trustworthiness is predictably followed by an exodus of mutual fund
investors and by extension a loss of profitability to the manager. See Stone, supra note 164
(noting that the market-timing problem caused major damage to Janus's reputation, and following
a bad bear market, its funds took major losses due to its aggressive investment philosophy).
167. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299; see also In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 115 (noting

that the original complaint was filed by a JCG shareholder in November 2003 and later
transferred from the District of Colorado to the District of Maryland and consolidated with the
current class action that named First Derivative Traders as lead plaintiff).
168. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300-01.
169. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 (D. Md. 2007).
170. Id at 621. For access to fund details, prices, overviews, and prospectuses and reports,
see JANUS.COM, https://ww3.janus.com/Janus/Retail/StaticPage?jsp=jsp/umbrella/UmbrellaPage
.jsp (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
171. Id. at 623. The court refused to find similarities in authorities provided by the plaintiffs
to substantiate a nexus. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2000)
(finding shareholders in one corporation may have stated securities fraud claims against another
company); see also Zelman v. JDS Uniphase Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 956, 958, 974 (N.D. Cal.
2005) (finding JDS liable to purchasers of equity-linked debt securities tied to JDS stock but
issued by a Swiss Bank).
172. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 622.
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injury to the mutual fund investors. 173 However, unlike the direct fraud
perpetrated on the mutual fund investors in that case, the JCG
shareholders in the present case were not the intended victims of the
same fraudulent scheme. 174 Thus, the court held that a mutual fund
investment advisor (JCM) that made misrepresentations to mutual fund
investors could not be held liable under § 10(b) to shareholders of the
parent company (JCG). 175 Moreover, the court distinguished the
liability at issue in this case from the liability that an underwriter might
face in similar circumstances. 176 The court noted that an underwriterin contrast to an investment advisor-could be held liable for preparing
and disseminating a prospectus containing misrepresentations and/or
omissions1 77 because it plays a "central role . . . in the issuance of
securities and the special reliance placed on them by prospective
investors."178 Under the district court's view, this was not true of
investment advisors. 179
C. The Fourth Circuit's Reversal

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
holding, finding that the plaintiffs pled with sufficient particularity that
JCM made misleading statements.1 8 0 The court found a causal
173. Id. See generally In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Md. 2005)
(containing the opinion of the related case the district court refers to that was brought by mutual
fund investors in the Janus funds against JCG, JCM, and others).
174. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 622; see also In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig.,

384 F. Supp. 2d at 856-57 (holding that market timing was a 'scheme or artifice to defraud' or,
at least, 'a practice . . . or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit' upon those who
have been misled or lulled into purchasing mutual fund shares in ignorance of its occurrence").
175. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
176. Id. at621.
177. Id; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1665 (9th ed. 2009) (defining an underwriter as

"[o]ne who buys stock from the issuer with an intent to resell it to the public; a person or entity,
esp. an investment banker, who guarantees the sale of newly issued securities by purchasing all or
part of the shares for resale to the public").
178. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 621 (quoting In re MTC Elec. Tech.

S'holder Litig., 993 F. Supp. 160, 161-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)); see also Samuel N. Allen, A
Lawyer's Guide to the Operation of UnderwritingSyndicates, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 319, 321

(1991) (discussing how the role of a managing underwriter is sought after by investment banks
usually because that will entail the ability to "run the books," which is an important role that
allows for the most control over the offering of the new issuance and will earn the greatest
percentage of the gross spread in the offering).
179. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 621.

180. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, Janus Capital Grp.,
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (staring that to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "[flactual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption
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connection between the false or misleading statements and the decrease
in JCG's share price that injured the JCG shareholders. 1 8 1 After
recounting the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint, the Fourth Circuit
held that the plaintiffs had convincingly asserted that the misleading
statements made in the funds' prospectus by JCM fraudulently induced
investors to buy shares in the Janus funds. 182 Additionally, the court
noted a claim originally made by the New York Attorney General that
the market-timing accusations in the Janus Funds had caused a "crisis of
confidence among [JCG] common stock investors," which, in turn,
resulted in the sharp decrease in share price. 183 Moreover, the
plaintiffs' complaint alleged that "'as a practical matter JCM runs' the
Janus funds," and therefore, investors could have relied on statements in
the prospectuses made by JCM. 1 84 The plaintiffs' argument was based
on the "fraud-on-the-market theory."' 8 5 This theory posits that when
the allegedly fraudulent statements at issue become public, the market
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)" (internal citations
omitted)).
181. See In re Mut. FundsInv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 118 (stating that "the misleading statements
in the Janus funds' prospectuses stating the funds' policy of deterring market timing fraudulently
induced investors to buy shares in the Janus funds," which led to higher amounts of invested
assets that led to higher revenues and an inflated stock price); see also Stone, supra note 164
(quoting a number of stock analysts' negative outlooks on JCG stock following the probe by New
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer: "This puts them many steps back;" "[Allegations] represent
a serious breach of investor trust and fiduciary duty;" "This clearly raises the stakes from a risk
standpoint").
182. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 118-21, 127; see also Lowenfels & Bromberg,

supra note 89, at 4 (examining cases where investors that took part in transactions "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of securities state fraud claims of being induced into purchasing the
securities).
183. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 118; see also Jeremy Adams, BoA and Janus
Under Fire in Spitzer's Fund Probe, EFINANCIALNEWS.COM
(Sept. 4, 2003),

http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2003-09-04/boa-and-janus-under-fire-in-spitzers-fundprobe (quoting New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as saying that the mutual fund operators
violated their fiduciary duties to their long-term mutual fund holders, suggesting they were
essentially bought off).
184. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 125 (quoting Joint Appendix at 212, Janus
Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525)); see also
Adams, supranote 183 (describing the allowances made for hedge funds to trade after hours that
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer likened to "allowing people [to] place bets on a horse
race after it has finished").
185. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 123-24 (explaining the fraud-on-the-market
theory). The court stated:
[B]ased on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of
a company's stock is determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business, and misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers
of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.
Id. (quoting Basic Inc.v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988)).
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price of the security reflects the publicly available information, and
therefore, any investor who purchases the security at the market price is
assumed to have relied on the statement. 186 The court agreed and held
that the plaintiffs adequately stated a claim against JCM for liability
under § 10(b). 18 7 Because JCM could be directly liable under § 10(b),
the court also held that plaintiffs adequately pled that JCG could be
liable under a § 20(a) "control person" theory, because, in reality, JCG
exerted complete control over JCM.18 8
The court did, however, refuse to adopt either the "direct
attribution" 189 or "substantial participation" 90 standard for pleading
reliance; instead, it would make determinations on a case-by-case
basis.191 Accordingly, the court discussed the numerous examples of
entwinement and overlap between JCG, JCM, and the Janus Funds. 192
These circumstances created sufficient allegations in the pleadings that
JCM-and JCG by extension-played a substantial role as a primary
violator of § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 based on a fraud-on-the-market
theory of reliance. 193
D. The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari

In their petition for certiorari, the defendants asked the court to
consider whether "a service provider [could] be held primarily liable in
a private securities-fraud action" for assisting another company in
making misstatements or for statements not directly attributable to the
186. Id; see also Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 246-47 (discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory).
187. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 127-28.

188. Id. at 129-30.
189. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 124 (defining direct attribution as "an
inexact proxy for determining whether investors will attribute a publicly available statement to a
particular person or entity").
190. See id. at 123 (describing the attribution required for attaching reliance to a party,
"substantial participation or intricate involvement in preparing the misleading statement is
sufficient to state a primary violation of § 10(b)").
191. See id. at 124 ("[T]he attribution determination is properly made on a case-by-case basis
by considering whether interested investors would attribute to the defendant a substantial role in
preparing or approving the allegedly misleading statement."); see also Davis Polk & Wardwell,
Investment Management Regulatory Update, 1849 PLI/CORP 121, 134-35 (2010) (discussing

circuit court use of direct attribution and substantial participation).
192. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 115; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note

151, at 3-4 (stating that seventeen officers of the Janus Funds were also Vice Presidents at JCM,
and that the Janus Funds' Board was chaired by the founder and former CEO of JCG).
193. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litigation, 566 F.3d at 131 ("[W]e conclude that plaintiffs have

pled a viable claim of primary § 10(b) liability against JCM and have adequately pled that JCG
may be liable as a control person of JCM under § 20(a)."); see also supra note 185 and
accompanying text (discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory).
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service provider.194 In a sharply divided five-to-four decision, Justice
Thomas, writing for the majority, reversed the Fourth Circuit and held
that an investment advisor and its parent company could not be held
liable in a private action under Rule 1Ob-5 for false statements included
in mutual fund prospectuses that were "made" by the investment fund
itself.195
1. Justice Thomas's Majority Opinion
The Court began its discussion by affirming the implied private right
of action under § 10(b) adopted in Bankers Life; however, it noted its
concern that the judicial creation should not be expanded, thus
reiterating the "narrow dimensions" of the private right of action. 1 96
The Court held that "[o]ne 'makes' a statement by stating it."1 97 It
proclaimed that "[flor purposes of Rule 1Ob-5, the maker of a statement
is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement," using
the relation between a speechwriter and a speaker as an analogy.' 9 8 The
Court discussed its holding in Central Bank to highlight that private
actions against aiding and abetting were no longer allowed under
securities laws and that if the plaintiffs' argument was affirmed, liability
would expand drastically.199 Control and authority over statements, the
194. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,
131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525).
195. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2229, 2301-02; see also Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative
Traders,

ALLIANCE

FOR

JUSTICE

BLOG,

http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-issues/the-

corporate-court/janus-capital-group-v-first-derivative-traders.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012)
(asserting that the Court's decision "limited the power of private investors and the courts to hold
[corporate] insiders [liable] for securities fraud").
196. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301-02 (asserting that the narrow interpretation of the private right
of action under § 10(b) is consistent with Congress's intent because Congress did not expressly
authorize the right in the original statute and did not affirm or expand the right when it revisited
the law); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1331 (noting that the Court abandoned its broad
application of the implied right of action under § 10(b) in 1975 and "[has] not returned to it
since").
197. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (describing the definition of the word "make" and how it was
grammatically used in the statute); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining make as "l. To cause (something) to exist . .. 2. To enact (something) ... 3. To acquire
(something) ... 4. To legally perform, as by executing, signing, or delivering (a document)").
198. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. In highlighting the "control" distinction of the rule, the Court
goes on to say that "one who prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its
maker." Id. Moreover, the Court ties attribution to the person/entity with ultimate control over

the statement, describing the speechwriter/speaker analogy as "[e]ven when a speechwriter drafts
a speech, the content is entirely within the control of the person who delivers it. And it is the
speaker who takes credit-or blame-for what is ultimately said." Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 1041 (9th ed. 2009) (showing that nowhere in any of the four different definitions
provided by Black's Law Dictionary is there any mention of "control" as defining "make").
199. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 n.6 (criticizing the dissent's interpretation of primary
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Court added, would create a more transparent line to reliance on the part
of those that are injured. 200 The plaintiffs argued that JCM had
overwhelming control and a unique relationship with the mutual fund
creating reliance and attribution. 20 1 Nevertheless, the Court disagreed
by holding that "[w]e decline this invitation to disregard the corporate
form," emphasizing that JCM and the Janus Funds were separate legal
entities and that the Janus Funds had an independent board of
trustees. 202 If this type of liability was allowed, Justice Thomas stated,
the responsibility to address it should fall on Congress. 2 03 The Court
also rejected the SEC's argument that the word "make" should be
defined as "create" and that those who create or write a statement that is
false or misleading to investors should be held liable as primary
violators. 204 Instead, the Court elected to treat the drafting of a false
statement as entirely different from taking part in a deceptive
transaction, holding that drafting is merely an undisclosed act that
precedes the act of a separate entity making a public statement.205

liability, saying that it would not limit liability much, if at all); see also Lorne, supra note 104, at
556 (discussing aiding and abetting after CentralBank).
200. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2309; see also Prentice, supra note 36, at 395-404 (discussing
questions of reliance left unanswered after Stoneridge).
201. Janus, 131 S. Ct at 2298; see also Brief of Law Professors William A Birdthistle et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10-15, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525) (arguing that investment managers exert an
extraordinary degree of control over their mutual funds).
202. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304; see also Brief of Law Professors, supra note 201, at 17
(asserting that allowing the petitioners argument to stand, which the Court did, would show
potential future perpetrators that all they need to do in order to avoid certain forms of securities
fraud is to structure a business to mirror the mutual fund industry).
203. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304; see also Worst Decisions,#3: Janus Capital v. First Derivative,
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE BLOG (Sept. 28, 2011), http://afjjusticewatch.blogspot.com/2011/09
/worst-decisions-3-janus-capital-v-first.html (counting down the ten worst Supreme Court
decisions of the 2010-11 term and noting that it would be difficult to imagine that Congress
intended to open such a gaping loophole in securities law, as the Court did in Janus).
204. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303-04 ("This definition, although perhaps appropriate when
'make' is directed at an object unassociated with a verb . . . fails to capture its meaning when
directed at an object expressing the action of a verb."). The Court used the SEC as a means to
reject respondent's argument that JCG and JCM were violators because they made the prospectus
available on their combined website, stating, "[W]e do not think the SEC 'makes' the statements
in the many prospectuses available on its Web site." Id. at 2305 n.12; see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525) (concluding that its interpretation
follows that "one can 'make' a statement by 'creat[ing]' or 'writ[ing]' it, even if the statement's
creator is not expressly identified").
205. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304; see also Brief of Law Professors, supranote 201, at 20 (stating
that petitioners had admitted that JCM attorneys drafted the prospectuses).
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2. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, opened by describing the many
functions of JCM as an investment adviser to the Janus Funds.20 6
Regarding the interpretation of the word "make," Justice Breyer
criticized the majority for limiting the scope of the word without using
prior case law or a common understanding of the English word, stating
that many parties can take part in the making of a statement for
purposes of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 20 7 The dissent asserted that the
majority misinterpreted CentralBank and looked past the holding that a
secondary actor can still be held liable as a primary violator in a private
cause of action for securities fraud if the requirements of Rule 1Ob-5 are
met-which they were in Janus.20 8 The dissent claimed that the
majority rule created a foundation upon which guilty management could
build a veil of protection against liability. 2 09

IV. ANALYSIS
The Janus decision incited a strong reaction. 2 1 0 In Justice Thomas's
short opinion, the Court set out to define areas of private securities
206. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that along with each of the
Janus Funds officers being JCM employees, JCM also "manages the purchase, sale, redemption,
and distribution of the Fund's investments . . . prepares, modifies, and implements the Janus
Funds' long-term strategies ... [and] acting through those employees, carries out the Fund's daily
activities"); see also Brief of Law Professors, supra note 201, at 13 (noting that the Court, the
U.S. Senate, and the Executive Branch have all previously noted the extraordinary degree of
control that managers maintain over their funds).
207. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2306-07 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that depending on the
circumstances, "a management company, a board of trustees, individual company officers, or
others, separately or together, might 'make' statements contained in a firm's prospectus-even if
a board of directors has content-related responsibility" and adding that context is helpful in
determining who made a statement and to whom it may be attributed); see also Cooper v. Pickett,
137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating previous holdings where corporate defendants had
been held directly liable under Rule lOb-5 for providing false or misleading information through
third-parties).
208. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra note 131 and
accompanying text (quoting language from the Court's decision in Central Bank that listed
secondary actors who could still be held liable as primary violators).
209. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer warned that the
majority's adopted approach runs the risk of curtailing the SEC's authority to pursue prosecution
against primary violators in the context of aiding and abetting without the knowledge of those
who "control" the "making" of the statements. Id. at 2310. He concluded the discussion by
convincingly stating, "I can find nothing in § 10(b) or in Rule lOb-5, its language, its history, or
its precedent suggesting that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, intended a loophole of the
kind that the majority's rule may well create." Id. at 2311 (emphasis added); see also Brief of
Law Professors, supra note 201, at 15 (asserting that, if adopted, petitioners' argument would
create a blueprint for widespread securities fraud).
210. See Jeffrey Gordon, Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders: Only the Supreme
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litigation, a decision that surprised legal analysts. 211 This Part explores
several concepts that emerge from the Janus opinion within the context
of securities fraud litigation that will impact future private securities
action. 212
A. Primaryand Secondary Liability
Prior to Central Bank, an injured plaintiff could bring a § 10(b)
private action against a primary actor-the defendant who made the
material misrepresentation or omission---or a secondary/collateral
actor-the defendant who aided and abetted another in making such a
material misrepresentation or omission. 213 Until Central Bank, the
difference between primary and secondary liability was moot--either
actor was inherently liable under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.214 As stated
in Part II, the Court's decision in Central Bank was motivated by
statutory language of § 10(b), or more precisely, the lack of clear
statutory language creating a right of action for aiding and abetting.2 15
In abolishing a private right of action against aiding and abetting, the
Court addressed its concern with the unpredictability and uncertainty
that unforeseen liability created for securities professionals. 216
Court can "Make " a Tree, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION

(June 29, 2011, 9:27 AM), http://blogs.1aw.harvard.edulcorpgov/2011/06/29/janus-capital-groupv-first-derivative-traders-only-the-supreme-court-can-"make"-a-tree/ (stating that this is "one of
those cases that takes your breath away," and questioning why the Court is aiming to insulate
fraudulent actors from accountability); see also Worst Decisions #3, supra note 203 (rating the
Janusdecision the third worst decision of the Court's 2010-2011 term).
211. See Gordon, supra note 210 (asserting that Janus will make it easier to shift liability from
actual wrong-doers, creating uncertainty over the scope of "control person" liability under §20(b)
of the 1934 Act and may necessitate new rules by the SEC that will potentially lead to new
litigation).
212. Infra Part IV.A-C.
213. See Robert A. Prentice, Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line
Between PrimaryandSecondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 701 (1997)
(noting a successful aiding and abetting claim requires three elements: (1) a primary violation by
another actor, (2) the defendant knew of the fraud and consciously furthered it, and (3) "the
defendant substantially assisted the violation"); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1289
(stating that in CentralBank, the Court overturned thirty years of lower court precedent on aiding
and abetting liability).
214. See Prentice, supra note 213, at 704 (discussing the needless act-prior to Central
Bank-of distinguishing between forms of liability by lower courts because both theories were
punished similarly); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1289 (stating that the Court
acknowledged a concern that a clear framework for liability under aiding and abetting claims was
needed).
215. See supra Part II.E.2 (discussing the elimination of private action claims for aiding and
abetting after CentralBank).
216. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 18889 (1994); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1289-90 (discussing CentralBank's restoration
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However, Central Bank sustained possible liability for collateral actors
who met the required elements of primary liability under the scope of
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 2 17 Despite its attempt at clarity, the Court did
not decide the proper method for courts to determine primary liability
under § 10(b).2 1 8 Therefore, commentators believed a collateral actor
could still be held liable as a primary offender for participating in a
fraud.219
The Court slightly clarified the uncertainty left after Central Bank
with its decision in Stoneridge, where it solidified a plaintiffs need to
show actual reliance on a violator's actions 22 0 and acknowledged its
suspect view of scheme liability. 22 1 The Court emphasized the
necessity of a "requisite causal connection" between the purported
misrepresentation or omission and the plaintiffs reliance that led to the
of aiding and abetting liability in actions brought by the SEC, but not in actions brought by
private plaintiffs).
217. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191; see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1290-91 (discussing
strategies that plaintiffs undertake to evade the impact of Central Bank by relying on different
sections of SEC rules in order to substantiate primary violator claims against defendants who
could most likely be considered secondary violators).
218. David R. Allen, Note, A New Breath of Life for PrivateRule JOB-5(B) Litigation After
Stoneridge: SEC v. Tambone and Implied Statements By CollateralActors, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.

2093, 2097 (2011) (explaining that Central Bank did not directly address the proper scope of
primary liability); see also In re MTC Elec. Tech. S'holders Litig., 898 F. Supp 974, 987
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that Central Bank created confusion among lower courts in trying to
find a distinction between primary and secondary liability).
219. See Prentice, supra note 213, at 697 (asserting that liability would still attach to those
that showed a significant participation in a fraud, despite not being the speaker of the
misstatement or omission and adding that, "a 'participation' standard is certainly appropriate for
determining the scope of [§] 10(b)/Rule lOb-5 primary liability of defendants in the aftermath of
Central Bank").

220. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)
(stating that Central Bank concluded that § 10(b) implied private right of action does not extend
to aiding and abetting claims and that their analysis-in Stoneridge-would seek to establish the
elements of the conduct of a secondary actor that would hold the actor liable as a primary actor
under the implied private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5); see also Prentice, supra
note 36, at 355 (asserting that, after Stoneridge, the Court continued to believe that the private
right of action under securities laws should be construed very narrowly).
221. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 160 (disclaiming the petitioners argument of scheme liability,
stating that the argument "does not answer the objection that petitioner did not in fact rely upon
respondents' own deceptive conduct" (emphasis added)); see also Prentice, supra note 36, at
355-56 (asserting that Rule lob-5 is still a "valid SEC rule that clearly forbids schemes to
defraud" and that "[n]othing in the language of the Stoneridge majority opinion is to the
contrary"); Jonathan C. Dickey et al., Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: The
Supreme Court Rejects "Scheme" Liability, INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW

ADVISOR 4, Jan. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
Dickey-Stoneridge-Insights.pdf ("The Court's decision in Stoneridge is significant because of its
rejection of theories of reliance that rest on chains of inference so attenuated as to extend 'the
private cause of action under § l0(b) ... beyond the securities market."').
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injury. 222 Under this regime, a plaintiff does not have a private cause of
action under § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 unless she directly relied on the
defendant's misstatement or omission.223 Thus, because a plaintiff
could be expected to rely on the statements of a collateral actor, the
Court left open the chance of liability in such scenarios when it held that
"[r]eliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant's deceptive acts is an
essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action." 224 However,
this decision did not resolve the issue of how to discern "deceptive
conduct" by non-speaking defendants who otherwise had no duty to
disclose. 225
Deceptive conduct or not, by finding that the misleading statements
had been made by Janus Funds and not JCM, Justice Thomas drew a
line between primary liability for the maker of a statement and the
person or entity with ultimate control over the statement.226 The maker
of a statement without ultimate control would only be secondarily liable
for aiding and abetting, but as the Court clarified in Central Bank,
aiding and abetting cannot be pursued in private suits. 227 However, as
Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, the question remains as to who
would be held primarily liable if management was guilty of writing a
false and misleading statement that deceives the board of directors and
the public.228 The answer seems to be no one, apparently, despite the
fact that under common law agency doctrine, management would be
222. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159; see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346
(2005) (holding that in order to prove damages in a securities fraud case, plaintiffs must prove a
causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the subsequent decline in the stock's
price).
223. See Prentice,supra note 36, at 363 (asserting that the Court in Stoneridge formulated its
approach and reasoning for the decision for the purpose of narrowing the private right to sue in
general); see also Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 1297 (noting that a key to defeating class
certification in fraud-on-the-market theories of reliance is to show that individual issues of
reliance defeat the predominance requirement).
224. Stoneridge,552 U.S. at 159.
225. See Dickey, supra note 221, at 5 ("For now, the defendants bar applauds the result [in
Stoneridge], and takes comfort in the strong policy statements issued by the Court in its
opinion."); see also Prentice, supra note 36, at 398 (asserting that the most obvious meaning of
the phrase "or indirectly" in the 1934 Act is that defendants can be liable under § 10(b) and Rule
lob-5 for issuing a statement they did not directly speak themselves).
226. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 n.6 (20t1)
(noting that the dissent was correct in determining that CentralBank involved secondary liability
but adding "for Central Bank to have any meaning, there must be some distinction between those
who are primarily liable (and thus may be pursued in private suits) and those who are secondarily
liable (and thus may not be pursued in private suits)").
227. Id. at 2302; see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 176 (1994) (stating that aiding-and-abetting liability was not covered by § 10(b)).
228. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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held primarily liable as the principal's agent and not simply for aiding
and abetting another. 229
B. Defining Who "Makes" a Statement
The decisions in Central Bank and Stoneridge were also void of an
explanation of how courts should determine what party "makes" a
statement for purposes of liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and
Janus has filled the void in a manner that effectively leaves the private
right of action under § 10(b) on life support. 230 In his result-driven
opinion, Justice Thomas linked the Court's decisions in Central Bank
and Stoneridge with the rule it adopted in Janus.23 1 In comparing its
holding to Central Bank, Justice Thomas asserted that to broaden the
interpretation of the word "make" to include persons or entities without
ultimate control over a statement would undermine precedent.232
Conversely, in his dissent, Justice Breyer correctly pointed out that
Central Bank is different than Janus.233 He convincingly argued that
the majority's new rule did not logically follow Central Bank.2 34
229. Id.
230. See id. at 2302-03 (majority opinion) ("Concerns with the judicial creation of a private
cause of action caution against its expansion ... we must give 'narrow dimensions. . . to a right
of action Congress did not authorize' . . . the narrow scope that we must give the implied private
right of action . . . we will not expand liability."); see also Stephen Metcalf, Some Will Rob You
With a Six-Gun, and Some With a Fountain Pen, HANDSOME CAMEL BLOG (June 24, 2011),
http://thehandsomecamel.wordpress.com/2011/06/24/some-will-rob-you-with-a-six-gun-andsome-with-a-fountain-pen/ (asserting that the Janus decision "basically gives large corporations a
license to commit fraud as long as they set up a shell company to take the fall").
231. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 ("[The Central Bank and Stoneridge holdings] suggest the rule
we adopt today: the maker of a statement is the entity with authority over the content of the
statement and whether and how to communicate it. Without such authority, it is not "necessary
and inevitable" that any falsehood will be contained in the statement ... we will not expand
liability beyond the person or entity that ultimately has authority over a false statement."); see
also Prentice, supra note 36, at 409 (impressively foreshadowing that the "tone of both [Central
Bank and Stoneridge] is so unsympathetic to the private right to sue, it could not surprise anyone
if the majority of the Court were to hold that only an authorwhose name is on afalse statement at
issuancecan be liable"(emphasis added)).
232. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. The Court added, "If persons or entities without control over
the content of a statement could be considered primary violators who 'made' the statement, then
aiders and abettors would be almost nonexistent." Id.; see also Prentice, supra note 36, at 409
(predicting that the Court could reach the result of attaching liability only to the person/entity
whose name is on the statement by holding either "(1) that one does not make a false statement
unless his name is on it, or (2) that reliance upon a defendant's identity (not just his statements or
omissions) is necessary").
233. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
234. See id. ("[A] rule (the majority's rule) absolving those who allegedly did make false
statements does not 'follow from' a rule (Central Bank's rule) absolving those who concededly
did not do so.").
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Central Bank involved attaching liability to an individual helping
someone else make a statement-i.e., secondary liability and aiding and
abetting.235 Janus, on the other hand, involved primary liability; JCM
made the statements itself rather than aiding and abetting the Janus
Funds in doing so. 2 36 Moreover, the Janus Funds could not make a
representation about an act-market timing-over which they had no
control. 237 JCM wrote the statements, made the deals with hedge funds,
allowed the trades to go through, profited from the scheme, and JCM's
actions alone directly caused injury to JCG's shareholders by fostering
an aura of mistrust between JCM and mutual fund investors that led to
an exodus of assets under management and considerably lower revenue
for JCG.238 As the dissent noted, it is a misapplication of justice to
allow fraudulent actors to escape liability from private recourse in order
to respect the "corporate form." 239
Justice Thomas also stated that by adopting the new rule that ultimate
control over a statement dictates who makes a statement for liability
purposes under § 10(b), this decision aligns with the Court's decision in

235. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2308 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
236. Id.; see also Metcalf,supra note 230 ("[E]ven though employees of [JCM] actually wrote
the misleading statements, even though they managed nearly every substantive aspect of the
operation of the fund, they cannot be held responsible because they did not 'make' the statements.
The 'person' under law who made the statements was the entity on whose behalf the offending
prospectus was issued, [Janus Funds], which has no capital other than the money it invests for
shareholders.").
237. The majority spent most of the opinion discussing the ultimate control and authority over
the making of a statement-justifiably so given the reasons for granting certiorari. Janus, 131 S.
Ct. at 2299-2305. However, nothing is mentioned in the majority opinion about the control over
the act the prospectus deems to prohibit. Id. Market-timing activity was at the heart of the injury
for both the fund shareholders and JCG stockholders. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Therefore, the Court should have at least addressed the potential issue of a corporate agent
controlling or pursuing a fraudulent activity prohibited by securities law, rather than trying to
avoid responsibility by simply using a conduit for legal liability purposes. This is a major hole in
the opinion and will be further discussed infra Part V.A. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note
201, at 10 (stating that market-timing fraud involves control by investment managers of all
operations of a mutual fund and can only be perpetrated with the assistance and willingness of the
investment manager).
238. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299-2300 (describing the background of the case); see also
Brief of Law Professors, supra note 201, at 10 ("An investment manager orchestrates a markettiming ruse first by luring prey [mutual fund investors], then setting predators [market timers]
upon it.").
239. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 (discussing the fact that, despite the plaintiffs' persuasive
argument that investment advisers exercise significant influence over their funds, the Court would
not disregard the corporate form); see also Brief of Law Professors, supra note 201, at 10
(asserting that the far-reaching mechanics of market-timing fraud reveals JCM's primary role in
the violating § 10(b)).
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Stoneridge.24 0 That case, Justice Thomas argued, properly dismissed
the plaintiffs complaint because the public did not rely on the parties'
undisclosed deceptive acts. 24 1 The facts in Stoneridge, however,
involved suppliers/customers of Charter Communications who aided
and abetted the eventual misrepresentations. 2 4 2 Thus, it is true that the
public could not have directly relied on the deceptive acts of this inside
transaction. 24 3 However, unlike the transaction underlying Stoneridge,
the overwhelming majority of shareholders and mutual fund investors in
the investment manager industry directly rely on statements made by
the investment advisors who run the day-to-day operations of their
respective funds. 244 Despite the legal structure of the mutual fund
industry, owners of investment manager stock-like JCG
shareholders-and mutual fund investors invariably associate an
investment manager with the mutual fund, meaning the relationship
between the two is publicly understood to be that of one entity. 245 This
relationship construct is completely different from the one in
Stoneridge.246
240. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166-67 (2008) (holding that an investor claim for a private right of action
under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 needs to show direct reliance on the defendant's deceptive acts
prior to the purchase or sale of securities).
241. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303; see also Prentice, supra note 36, at 405 (stating that the Court
in Stoneridge admitted that the defendants acted "in concert" with Charter Communications in the
fraudulent scheme but reasoned, however, that the "concert[ed]" activity was not enough,
publicly, to find them liable as primary violators).
242. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 153 (noting that Scientific Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola were
suppliers-by supplying cable boxes-and later customers-by buying advertising-of Charter
Communications); see also Prentice, supra note 36, at 405 (asserting that the vendors should have
been found liable under the rule of scheme liability because they knowingly took part in an illegal
scheme).
243. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159 ("[Suppliers] had no duty to disclose; and their deceptive
acts were not communicated to the public. No member of the investing public had knowledge,
either actual or presumed, of [suppliers'] deceptive acts during the relevant times.").
244. See Joseph A. Franco, A Consumer ProtectionApproach to Mutual FundDisclosureand
the Limits of Simplfication, 15 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 1, 57 (2009) (noting that, in today's

environment, investors rely on sponsor generated investor information rather than SEC-mandated
fund disclosures).
245. See Nancy L. Conlin, Mutual FundExpenses: Caveat Investor?, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING

L. 365, 371 (1994) (stating that, despite the growth in the mutual fund industry, the structure of
fund distribution methods have remained relatively unchanged when looking at the relationship
between a fund and its investment adviser/affiliate/sponsor); see also Nathan Hale, Fund
Investors Take a Hit from the Supreme Court, CBS MONEYWATCH (June 20, 2011, 7:00 AM),

http://moneywatch.bnet.com/investing/blog/fund-watch/fund-investors-take-a-hit-from-thesupreme-court/654/ ("[A]nyone who's spent two minutes thinking about it know that the notion
that a mutual fund is independent of its advisor is laughable.").
246. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159 (discussing the lack of direct reliance the public had with
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In his dissent, Justice Breyer discussed the clear distinctions between
Stoneridge and Janus.24 7 In Stoneridge, no one disputed the "making"

of statements, and no one disputed that the defendants were, in fact, the
"makers" of Charter's misstatements. 248 Rather, Stoneridge determined
whether the defendant's actions were sufficiently disclosed for the court
to find that the public directly relied on them. 249 The suppliers in
Stoneridge had no duty of disclosure and their deceptive actions were
never communicated to the public, so there were no grounds to support
reliance. 250 Conversely, Janus involved express actions and statements
that were intentionally disseminated to the public. 25 1 Given the obvious
distinctions, Justice Breyer inquired as to how Stoneridge actually
supported the majority's new rule. 252
C. UltimateAuthority and the Role of an Investment Advisor

The majority addressed Justice Breyer's dissenting arguments by
holding that respect for the "corporate form" instructs that those with
"ultimate authority" over statements in registered materials should be
held solely liable for purposes of the private right of action under
§ 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. 2 53 Certainly, this is a far dislocation from what
the suppliers).
247. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2309 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
248. Id; see also Prentice, supra note 36, at 406-07 (discussing liability under scheme
liability). Professor Prentice gives a hypothetical explaining how the non-makers of a statement
should be found liable: "Parties who have knowingly entered into fraudulent transactions with B
as part of a fraudulent scheme with the purpose of defrauding C should be liable when C relies
upon their actions, even if those actions were publicized not by themselves, but by B." Id.
249. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Where
Were the Lawyers? A Rehavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibilityfor Clients' Fraud,46

VAND. L. REV. 75, 89-90 (1993) (discussing how notions of privity are associated with ultimate
responsibility, which, in turn, justifies liability for providing false information).
250. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Langevoort, supranote 249, at
90 (asserting that courts [used to] define a duty to disclose when a party bears responsibility for
preparing the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation).
251. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2309-10 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also David R. Allen, supra note
218, at 2116 (discussing liability and duties in the dissemination of another party's statement).
252. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
253. Id A direct contradiction with Justice Thomas's respect for the corporate form was
noted in previous Supreme Court cases. See also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 629-30 (1983) ("[O]ur cases have long recognized
'the broader equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized generally and for
most purposes, will not be regarded when to do so would work fraud or injustice.' In particular
the Court has consistently refused to give effect to the corporateform where it is interposed to
defeat legislative policies." (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas
Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939))).
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Justice Douglas adopted some forty years earlier in Bankers Life.25 4
What is interesting about the majority's opinion in Janus is that its
discussion of the "corporate form" and "ultimate authority" completely
ignored the roles of the parties within the context of the case.2 55
As discussed in Part 11I.A, JCG was the parent company of JCM, an
investment advisor responsible for running the Janus Funds. 256 The
Janus Funds were separate legal entities solely created by JCG and run
by a board of trustees for the purpose of holding assets owned by
mutual fund shareholders. 2 57 In the prior 2010 session, the Court's
opinion in Jones v. HarrisAssociates provided a glimpse into how the
Court had come to understand the role of investment advisors in the
mutual fund industry. 258 In HarrisAssociates, the Court noted that "the
fund often 'cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the
adviser."' 259 Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the make-up of
254. See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971)
(discussing the broad interpretation of the implied private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5); see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 89, at 310 ("[P]rivate actions ... under ...
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are the most common actions for relief by defrauded investors in
our system of democratic capitalism .... ).
255. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304; see also J.J. McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 504, 515
(1910) ("[Protection for the corporate form] should not be carried so far as to enable the
corporation to become a means of fraud or a means to evade its responsibilities. . . . [Courts
increasingly] look beyond the corporate form to the purpose of it, and to the officers who are
identified with that purpose.").
256. See supra Part III.A (describing the entwined structure of JCG, JCM, and the Janus
Funds).
257. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd,Janus Capital Grp.,
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011); see also Lee McGowan, Making Sense
Out of the Structure of Mutual Funds, ABOUT.COM,

http://mutualfunds.about.com/od/

mutualfundbasics/a/fundstructure.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (discussing the structure of
mutual funds and noting that the only assets in a mutual fund are those invested by mutual fund
shareholders).
258. See Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010) ("A mutual fund is a pool of
assets, consisting primarily of [a] portfolio [of] securities, and belonging to the individual
investors holding the shares in the fund. . . . [The typical business arrangement includes a]
separate entity called an investment adviser [that] creates the mutual fund, which may have no
employees of its own."); see also McGowan, supra note 257 (describing the different types of
funds involved in Janus as including open-end mutual funds, closed-end mutual funds, exchangetraded funds, and unit investment trusts).
259. See Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. at 1422 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 481
(1979)) (involving mutual fund shareholders who sued the investment adviser of their mutual
fund for breach of his fiduciary duty by allegedly overcharging fees for his management
responsibilities); see also Sam Mamudi, The Unseen Figuresof Your Funds, WALL ST. J. (May 3,

2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704100604575146040314631942.html
(stating that records show very few instances when a fund board replaced a management
company and discussing only one instance of note-in 2005-when the board of the Clipper
Fund changed its manager for poor performance).
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the mutual fund industry is distinct from other sectors of the American
economy. 260 The relationship between a fund and its investment
advisor, the Court added, "[is] fraught with potential conflicts of
interest." 261 Furthermore, the Court recognized the problem of
disinterested directors on the board of a fund.2 6 2 Given this judicial
interpretive backdrop, it is evident that distinct risks of ownership exist
for stockholders of investment companies-like the plaintiffs in
Janus.263
The mutual fund industry in the United States is massive and holds
considerable influence in the corporate forum. 264
Investment
companies manage just over $13 trillion in investor assets and control
twenty-seven percent of U.S. corporate equities. 265 There are over
sixteen thousand different investment companies currently managing

260. HarrisAssocs., 130 S. Ct. at 1422. One distinct characteristic of the fund industry is that
a mutual fund board is not responsible simply for one fund; instead, many firms have one board
to oversee an entire line of mutual funds managed by a particular investment manager. See
Mamudi, supra note 259 ("Fund boards are stretched too thin.").
261. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. at 1422 (quoting Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S.
523, 536 (1984)); see also Mamudi, supra note 259 (statement of industry expert Adam Bold)
("'The system as it's set up is adequate at best because boards are fulfilling their basic fiduciary
duties . . . .' But the problem. . . is that's usually as far as the boards go.").
262. HarrisAssocs., 130 S. Ct. at 1428; see also Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual FundBoard:A
Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, I BROOK. J. CORP. FtN. & COM. L. 165, 166

(2006) ("[T]he fund board operates without meaningful oversight . . . . Despite regular and
continuing attempts by the SEC to strengthen board independence, the agency has failed to create
true board independence or to give the board clear guidance."). Furthermore, "most fund boards
are composed of industry-friendly, highly paid, long-serving directors .... The management firm
selects the initial board, and new directors (including independent directors) are vetted by the
management firm." Id. The realities inherent in mutual fund board make-up run counter to the
argument made by Justice Thomas that the Janus Funds' board only had one "interested person"
directly affiliated with JCG/JCM sitting on it; he argued that Janus Fund's board of trustees was
more independent than required by statute. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.
263.

See Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. at 1422 (quoting Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 536)

("Congress adopted the [Investment Company Act of 1940] because of its concern with the
potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies.").
264. See Conlin, supra note 245, at 365-66 (noting that, since the creation of the first mutual
fund in 1924, the industry has achieved enormous success and has become the third largest type
of financial institution in the U.S. behind commercial banks and life insurance companies); see
also Stephen Bainbridge, Mutual Fund Shareholder Activism, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM

BLOG (Mar. 28, 2011, 1:25 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/
2011/03/mutual-fund-shareholder-activism.html (discussing the large influence institutional
investors-like mutual funds-have on corporate governance issues, such as executive
compensation).
265. INV. Co. INST., supra note 154, at 8, 12. These statistics are as of the end of 2010. Id.
The $13 trillion is comprised of $11.8 trillion in mutual funds, $241 billion in closed-end funds,
$992 billion in exchange-traded funds, and $51 billion in unit investment trusts. Id. at 9.
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assets in the United States.2 66 Many of these investment companies,
including some of the largest, are publicly owned corporations. 26 7 It
follows that shareholders of these distinct corporations should be
afforded protections consistent with the structural nuances of the
industry.
In Janus, Justice Thomas declined the opportunity to enforce
liability, specific to the investment company context, for fraudulent
misrepresentations that caused actual shareholder injury.2 68 The Court
was likely concerned -with the reciprocal effects of holding a service
provider primarily liable for statements made by a separate legal entity
with "ultimate control" over said statements. 26 9 Unlike lawyers and
accountants, however, the characteristics of an investment advisor are
so acute and specific to its industry that the Court could have fashioned
a remedy for the shareholders who correctly sought justice for an injury
that was caused directly by the corporation's agents. 270
The rule adopted by the Court in Janus is unambiguous: for purposes
of the private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, primary
liability for material misrepresentations and/or omissions made in
registered correspondence will only attach to the actors responsible for
issuing the correspondence-i.e., ultimate control over the
correspondence. 271 The Court's clarity invites negative implications for
those seeking private action remedies under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.
266. Id. at 16.
267. See Matt

Krantz,

You

Can Invest

in

Many

Public Investment

Companies,

USATODAY.COM (Mar. 31, 2010, 8:21 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/columnist/
krantz/2010-03-31-investment-company-stocks N.htm (noting that some of the largest U.S. asset
managers that are publicly traded include Bank of New York Mellon, BlackRock, Franklin
Resources, State Street, T. Rowe Price Group, and John Hancock, which is a unit of Manulife
Financial, a large Canadian financial firm).
268. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011)
("We decline this invitation to disregard the corporate form."). For a calculation of the dollar
value of the loss associated with JCG's involvement in the market timing scandal, see infra note
279.
269. See Brief for Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 5, Janus Capital Grp., Inc., v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No.
09-525) (arguing that lawyers, like other outside service providers, cannot be held liable in a
private action under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 for statements not attributed to them).
270. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Practical matters related to
context, including control, participation, and relevant audience, help determine who 'makes' a
statement and to whom that statement may properly be 'attributed' . . . ."). Justice Breyer also
stated that "this Court pointed out that 'certain individuals who play a part in preparing the
registration statement,' including corporate officers, lawyers, and accountants, may be primarily
liable even where 'they are not named as having prepared or certified' the registration statement."
Id. at 2311 (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n.22 (1983)).
271. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303; see also Joseph B. Crace & Matthew M. Curley, District
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V. IMPACT

Before the Court issued its decision in Janus, analysts pondered the
effects the case would have on those most often responsible for the
content contained in a mutual fund prospectus-namely, investment
advisors to mutual funds, their attorneys, and accountants. 272 yet,
Janus may make it more difficult to attach liability in securities fraud
contexts beyond the sphere of these usual statement makers. 273
Particularly, Janus may limit liability when securities fraud is
perpetuated by the statements of corporate officers and in the asset
securitization process. 274 Accordingly, this Part explores the impact of
Janus on corporate officer liability through the lens of agency law and
examines the potential "blueprint for fraud" for parties involved in the
securitization of financial assets. 275

Courts Grapple with US. Supreme Court's Janus Decision, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS &

INSIGHT (Oct. 21, 2011), http:/newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/Insight/2011/10_October/DistrictcourtsgrapplewithU_S_SupremeCourt'sJanus decision/
(discussing
recent district court decisions that have had to interpret the Janus rule).
272. See Angiolillo & Youngwood, supra note 138, at I and accompanying text (discussing
the potential effects of the Janus decision).
273. See infra Part V.A-B (discussing corporate officer insulation and securitization fraud);
see also Crace & Curley, supra note 271 (discussing three district court decisions that have
applied the Janus decision and stating that one court noted that the Janus rule is limited to cases
involving Rule 1Ob-5(b), while another court refused to apply the limits of Janus to a case
involving a parent company and a wholly owned subsidiary).
274. See Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, Fiduciary Constraints:CorrelatingObligation

With Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 698 (2007) (asserting that although there are
federal statutes governing corporate officer behavior, for the most part, state law fiduciary
principles govern the conduct of corporate actors). See generally Coffee, supra note 20, at 1538
(arguing that, to deter securities fraud more effectively, damages should be imposed upon those
parties that are directly culpable-specifically on individual corporate managers-instead of the
corporation itself).
275.

See Greg Stohr, Mutual Fund Shareholder Suits Curbed by U.S. Supreme Court,

BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (June 13, 2011, 4:41 PM), http://www.businessweek.connews/2011-0613/mutual-fund-shareholder-suits-curbed-by-u-s-supreme-court.html (statement of Chicago-Kent
College of Law Professor William Birdthistle, who specializes in investment fund law and
securities regulation and who filed a brief backing the Janus shareholders) ("It's a blueprint for
operating companies to see what the investment companies are doing and to make themselves as
bulletproof as the investment advisors."); see also Jeff McCord, Supremes Make It Official: Wall
St. and Corporate Execs are Above the Law When They Lie to the Investing Public, ACTIVIST

POST BLOG (June 15, 2011), http://www.activistpost.com/2011/06/supremes-make-it-officialwall-st-and.html (asserting the Janus decision essentially means that, "[u]nless a corporate Board
itself makes a statement, the corporate entity has not spoken and neither it, nor the spokespeople
themselves, bear responsibility for what corporate officers say or write").
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A. CorporateOfficer Insulation
At oral arguments in Janus, Justice Sotomayor asked the petitioner
whether a company could escape liability by using another company as
a means to make misleading statements to the public. 276 The petitioner
responded by explaining the different courses of action one could
pursue against secondary actors. 277 JCM faced and settled claims
associated with a breach of fiduciary duty by fund shareholders and the
SEC.2 7 8 Remedy still escaped JCG shareholders, however, whom the
actions of JCM and the market-timing scheme soundly injured.2 7 9
The relationships of organizations are subject to the laws of
agency. 280 Under agency law, fiduciary duties exist when a principal
276. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral
arguments/argument transcripts/09-525.pdf (statement of J. Sotomayor) ("Do you mean to say to
me that puppets become a legal defense for someone who intentionally manipulates the market
information?").
277. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 276, at 6 (statement of petitioner's counsel)
("Congress has drafted two statutes that deal with puppets. Section 20(b), which these plaintiffs
have not invoked, makes it unlawful for one party to do indirectly what it would not be permitted
to do directly. That's the puppet statute .

. .

. [T]here's also 20(a), which is the control person

statute, also not invoked by these plaintiffs. Those are forms of secondary liability."); see also
Welle, supra note 16, at 547 (asserting that state and common law are inadequate to adjudicate
securities fraud).
278. See Christine Dugas & John Waggoner, Janus to Pay $225M to Settle Charges, USA
TODAY (Apr. 27, 2004, 10:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfilfunds/2004-04-27janus-settlement x.htm (stating that, as part of their settlement with New York Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer and Colorado Attorney General Ken Salazar, Janus agreed to pay $100 million in
fines and restitution ($50 million in restitution to injured investors and $50 million in penalties)
and reduce its fees by $125 million over five years); see also JanusAgrees to Pay $225 Million to
Settle Market Timing Probe, ACCOUNTINGWEB.COM (Apr. 27, 2004), http://www.accounting
web.com/item/99084 ("Janus acknowledged ... that ten investors were allowed to make shortterm trades in seven funds."). The disclosure of events led to the resignation of Janus CEO Mark
Whiston and the withdrawal of $16.1 billion in investor funds. Id.
279. See Hale, supra note 245 (stating that while the Janus settlement with mutual fund
shareholders helped to recoup their losses, owners of JCG stock, who were saddled with losses
from the stock price plummet arising from the scandal, have yet to recoup their losses); see also
Janus Capital Group (JNS), WIKINVEST.COM, http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Janus Capital
Group_(JNS)/EarningsPer Share (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (displaying excerpts from JCG's
10-k annual report from 2006, which lists JCG as having 229.5 million diluted common shares
outstanding as of Dec. 31, 2003). Taking the shares outstanding and multiplying by the loss in
stock price stated in the majority opinion results in an approximately $959,310,000 loss (17.6813.50 = 4.18 x 229.5 = 959) in shareholder value from September 2 to September 26, 2003. See
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2300 (2011) (noting the
stock price).
280. See Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. PIrr. L. REV. 495, 545 (2011)
(stating that one of the important innovations of the Third Restatement of Agency was the
inclusion of provisions that deal with agency law pertaining to organizations such as partnerships,
corporations, and limited liability companies); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law
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manifests assent to an agent that the agent shall act upon the principals
behalf.2 8 1 In the corporate context, this means the corporation will be
bound by actions taken by managers during the course of
employment. 282 Generally, shareholders can hold management liable
for fraudulent activities that have a causal connection to a loss in
shareholder value. 283 In Janus, managers committed securities fraud
during the course of their employment, which was perpetrated through
the Janus Funds, a conduit.28 4 The alleged fraud caused shareholders to
lose value. 285 Nevertheless, the Court decided that shareholders could,
in this context, hold neither the principal corporation (JCG) nor the
managers/agents (JCM) liable under § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 for the
damages because the defendants did not "make" the fraudulent
In so doing, the Court ushered in a potential
statements. 286
displacement of liability under agency law with respect to corporate
managers. 287 The Court has introduced the use of "puppeteer
Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1191

(2003) (stating that just about every corporate employee who has discretionary duties serves as an
agent of the corporation and that principles of agency are commonly invoked within the corporate
law context).
281. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (defining agency as "the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an
'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and
the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act").
282. See Dalley, supra note 280, at 546 (discussing the actual authority extended to corporate
officers by the corporation through the board of directors); see also Langevoort, supra note 280,
at 1192-93 (discussing the ongoing issue of whether a corporation should be looked upon as a
complex mix of people and contracts or as a standalone entity separate from individuals).
283. See Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in
Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1733 (1994) ("Shareholder suits are the primary
mechanism for enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate managers."); see also Langevoort,
supra note 280, at 1191-92 (stating that shareholders hold the board accountable through powers
associated with derivative suits, voting, inspection, and appraisal rights).
284. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
285. Id at 2300. After New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed a complaint against
JCG and JCM alleging market-timing issues, JCG stock fell almost twenty-five percent over the
next several weeks, and the fund lost considerable assets from disgruntled mutual fund
investors-thereby affecting the long-term profitability of JCG. Id.; see also Hale, supra note
245 (noting that stockholders lost considerable value resulting from the scandal).
286. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305; see also Stohr, supra note 275 (noting that Justice Thomas
focused on the legal distinction between JCG/JCM and the Janus Funds in finding no liability on
the part of JCM managers).
287. See Stephen Juris, Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders and the Law of
Unintended Consequences, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2011/
09/21/janus-capital-group-inc-v-first-derivative-traders-and-the-law-of-unintended-consequences/
(stating that the broadly worded decision in Janus can result in unintended and likely
unanticipated problems for the SEC in attaching primary liability to defendants under Rule 1Ob-5,
instead of needing to seek claims of aiding and abetting or looking to different sections of the
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capitalism," where corporate managers may be permitted to mislead,
misstate, omit, and otherwise lie to the public and escape the strictures
of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as long as they do so through a separate
entity. 288 Not only can this practice become widespread in the mutual
fund arena, but also corporate managers in other industries could
potentially shelter themselves from shareholder liability when making
public statements. 289
A fundamental principle of business is that the primary role of a
corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth.290 Yet, if corporate
managers are not held liable for explicitly committing securities fraud
while performing duties in their capacity as agents, then what use does §
10(b) or Rule lOb-5 have in the realm of private action? 291 Officers of
publicly traded corporations work by the will of,2 92 and on behalf of,
the shareholders who own the enterprise. 293 If, while performing those
1934 Act).
288.

See Editorial, So No One's Responsible?, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at A26, available

at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/opinion/15wed2.html? r-2 (arguing that JCG/JCM used
"legal ventriloquism to speak through the business trust and Janus Funds"); see also Angiolillo &
Youngwood, supra note 138 ("Do you mean to say to me that puppets become a legal defense for
someone who intentionally manipulates the market information?" (emphasis added) (quoting
Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 276, at 6 (statement of J. Sotomayor))).
289. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 201, at 17 (stating that petitioner's position
would lead to "[a]ny corporation publicly claiming to police the quality of its products while
secretly soliciting payments to compromise that quality . . . [receiving] a clear path to evading
legal liability").
290. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, "EnlightenedShareholder Value": CorporateGovernance
Beyond the Shareholder-StakeholderDivide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 73 (2010) (noting the purpose of

the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth); Henry T.C. Hu, New FinancialProducts, the
Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L.

REV. 1273, 1278 (1991) (stating that although few would disagree that the welfare of the
shareholder is the corporation's primary purpose, corporations are also subject to non-stockholder
constituency statutes and notions of social responsibility).
291. See Ho, supra note 290, at 83 (asserting that management failure to appreciate
environmental, social, and governance risks can hurt the company's, and by extension the
shareholder's, future financial performance).
292. In fact, corporate managers and agents work by the will of the board of directors, but the
shareholders vote the board of directors into office. MELVIN A. EISENBERG & JAMES D. Cox,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 213 (Robert C.

Clark et al. eds., 10th ed. 2011).
293. See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 292, at 233-42. The authors discuss the special
voting rules that can apply in the election of directors, including a staggered board, which is a
board that is divided into two or more classes, each of which is elected separately for staggered
terms (i.e., every two years). Id. at 233-42 This mechanism is seen as a defense against a
takeover, but also as a means to entrench current management. Id. at 233-34. Cumulative voting
is another rule where a shareholder takes the number of shares owned and multiplies that by the
number of directors to be elected; this allows that shareholder to distribute votes in any way he
would like. Id. at 236. Finally, there is plurality voting, which has come under heavy pressure
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duties, they commit fraud through misleading statements made to the
public-even indirectly through a conduit-they should be held liable
to their shareholders through private recourse under § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 if a causal connection to loss is proven. 294 Any other finding or
conclusion would be an affront to the important role that private causes
of action play in the marketplace and would serve to discredit the
functionality of the legal system. 295
B. SecuritizationFraud

Financial securitization is a broad term, 296 and there are many
financial assets that can form a securitized investment. 297 This Subpart
focuses on private-label home mortgage-backed securities ("MBS"). 2 98
recently, and allows the nominee with the most votes to be elected, even if there is no majority
amongst the nominees. Id. at 239. Many shareholder activists have called for states to change the
default rule in corporate statutes from plurality to majority as a means to increase shareholder
power. Id. at 240.
294. See Muir & Schipani, supra note 274, at 700 (stating that, within the corporate context,
there is a danger in "a system that would allow individual fiduciaries to avoid liability by arguing
that the wrongful act occurred in another fiduciary's area of responsibility-perhaps with the
result that, through such finger pointing, no fiduciary is held liable"); see also Hale, supra note
245 (noting that stockholders have been denied the ability to recoup losses even though Janus
admitted in their settlement to allowing secret deals that were a direct contradiction to its stated
policies made to the public through the Janus Funds' prospectus).
295. See Redwood, supra note 136, at 3-4 (asserting that the Janus decision has turned the
traditional method of analyzing a statute on its head).
296. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (9th ed. 2009) ("[Securitize means] [t]o convert
(assets) into negotiable securities for resale in the financial market, allowing the issuing financial
institution to remove assets from its books, and thereby improve its capital ratio and liquidity, and
to make new loans with the security proceeds if it so chooses."); see also Securitization
Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/securitization.asp#axzzlcf
2U2AYf (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) ("[Securitization is] [t]he process through which an issuer
creates a financial instrument by combining other financial assets and then marketing different
tiers of the repackaged instruments to investors. The process can encompass any type of financial
asset and promotes liquidity in the marketplace.").
297. See Harold S. Novikoff et al., New Developments in Structured Finance: Report by the
Committee on Bankruptcy and CorporateReorganizationof the Association of the Bar of the City

of New York, 56 Bus. LAw. 95, 97 (2000) (discussing the conventional assets to be securitized
and sold to investors, which include credit cards, vehicle loans, home equity/subprime mortgages,
manufactured housing, residential jumbo loans, and commercial real estate loans). Since 1995,
sponsors have begun to securitize new asset classes: stranded cost recovery receivables,
municipal tax liens, collateralized debt obligations, structured settlement payments, music
royalties, and auto leases. Id. at 105-06.
298. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 1282.1 (2011) (defining a private label security as "any mortgagebacked security that is neither issued nor guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae,
or any other government agency"); Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter,
Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41

CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (2009) (discussing the advent of the private-label securitization
market as deriving from the deregulation activities of the 1990s, and that originally, the private-
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The growth in private-label MBS has been attributed, in part, to the
creation of the housing bubble, which culminated in the financial crisis
of 2008.299 These securities have come under heightened scrutiny ever
since. 300 Moreover, MBS litigation is prominent in current class action
securities fraud jurisprudence. 30 1 Nevertheless, the profitability of the
label market only securitized jumbo mortgages, which are larger than the conventional standards
set by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); see also SecuritizationDefinition, supra note 296 (further
defining securitization).
Mortgage-backed securities are the perfect example of securitization. By combining
mortgages into one large pool, the issuer can divide the large pool into smaller pieces
based on each individual mortgage's inherent risk of default and then sell those smaller
pieces to investors . . . individual retail investors are able to purchase portions of a
mortgage as a type of bond. Without the securitization of mortgages, retail investors
may not be able to afford to buy into a large pool of mortgages.
Id.
299. See McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 298, at 1330 (discussing the private-label
market growing dramatically "from twenty-four percent of all mortgaged backed securities in
2003, totaling $586 billion, to a fifty-five percent share, totaling $1.19 trillion in 2005"); see also
Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime
Loans, 125 Q. J. ECON. 307, 353-54 (2010) (finding that securitization practices in the privatelabel mortgage-backed security market, particularly subprime loans, adversely affected the
screening incentives of subprime lenders, thereby causing an increased number of risky loans to
infest the marketplace). But see Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Did Securitization Cause the
Mortgage Crisis?, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oct. 19, 2011, 9:18 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/201 1/
10/19/did-securitization-cause-the-mortgage-crisis/ (discussing their findings that raise the
question of whether securitization caused the crisis and asserting that the question is not as
conclusive as some researchers and policymakers have held and that more evaluation needs to
take place).
300. See RANDALL S. KROSZNER & ROBERT J. SHILLER, REFORMING U.S. FINANCIAL
MARKETS: REFLECTION BEFORE AND BEYOND DODD-FRANK 66 (2011) (noting that, despite
reforms to try and reignite the private-label MBS market, many market participants feel that loan
originators have less incentive to carefully assess the likelihood of repayment of a particular
mortgage if they sell the mortgage into an MBS-pool rather than if they were required to keep the
loan on their own books); see also What's Holding Back the Restart of the Private-Label MBS
Market?, MARKET PIPELINE BLOG (Feb. 17, 2011), http://marketpipeline.blogspot.com/2011/02
/whats-holding-back-restart-of-private.html (statement of Michael A.J. Farrell, Chairman and
CEO of Annaly Capital Management, Inc., before a House Subcommittee) (giving several reasons
why the private-label market is not restarting, including: (1) rates are not conducive to excess risk
of private-label MBS; (2) there are higher yielding alternatives in the MBSs that were issued
during the crisis; (3) difficulty in securitizing newly-originated loans under heightened
underwriting standards; (4) uncertainty over the future regulatory environment; and (5) most
major institutional investors have guidelines that preclude them from taking the credit risk
associated with private-label MBS at current price levels).
301.

See CHRIS GAMAITONI, JASON STEWART & MIKE TURNER, COMPASS POINT RESEARCH

& TRADING, LLC, MORTGAGE REPURCHASES PART II: PRIVATE LABEL RMBS INVESTORS TAKE
AIM-QUANTIFYING THE RISKS, COMPASS PoINT RESEARCH & TRADING, LLC 1-2 (2010),

available at http://api.ning.com/files/fiCVZyzNTkoAzUdzhSWYNuHv33*Ur5ZYBh3S08zo*
phyT79SFiOTOpPG7klHe3h8RXKKyphNZqqytZrXQKbMxv4R3F6fN5dl/36431113MortgageFi
nanceRepurchasesPrivateLabel08172010.pdf (asserting that, due to increased litigation activity
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MBS market will not deter the marked participation of financial
industry actors. 302 Considering the liability issues that have arisen since
the 2008 crisis, however, market participants will be certain to seek
methods of limiting liability exposure in the underwriting and
distribution process. 303 This Subpart explores how Janus may help to
achieve the goal of displacing liability from corporate benefactors going
forward. 304
1. The Securitization Food Chain
The process of securitizing "private-label" mortgage loans involves
many parties. 305 In a typical securitization, the different parties could
include: borrower/homeowner, mortgage broker/originator, lender,
servicer, sponsor, depositor, trust/trustee, rating agency, insurer,
underwriter, and investor.306 It is interesting to note that in many cases
by investors of private-label MBS, liability exists for originators and underwriters of the initial
securitizations, and providing a timeline of major mortgage-related litigation dating back from
September of 2008 through August of 2010); see also Isaac Gradman, The Government Giveth
and It Taketh Away: The Significance of the Game Changing FHFA Lawsuits, SUBPRIME
SHAKEOUT BLOG (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.subprimeshakeout.com/2011/09/the-government(describing
giveth-and-it-taketh-away-the-significance-of-the-game-changing-fhfa-lawsuits.html
September 2, 2011 as a significant day in mortgage-crisis litigation because on that day the FHFA
filed seventeen lawsuits against almost all of the world's largest banks seeking recovery of
roughly two hundred billion dollars of mortgage-backed securities purchased by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac).
302. See Kenneth F. Fick, Securitized Profits: UnderstandingGain On Sale Accounting, J.
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2008/May/
2008),
(May
ACCOUNTANCY
SecuritizedProfits.htm (noting that despite the now less popular mortgage loan securitization
model, big banks will continue to utilize securitization of assets because of the segregation of risk
it offers, which allows for a greater degree of leverage for the banks, thereby increasing profit
potential).
303. See GAMAITONI, STEWART & TURNER, supra note 301, at 1 (noting that the lawsuits
brought forth by the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and large
investor groups are going after underwriters of the initial securitizations and generally claim that
the underwriters made misrepresentations within the initial prospectus for the investments); see
also Gradman, supra note 301 (discussing the reasons why plaintiffs are pursuing underwriters
via the securities claim route as opposed to utilizing put-back rights inherent in the mortgage
securities). Gradman also states that put-back claims-a method of getting the initial investment
back from the issuer-have high initial procedural hurdles that make it difficult for investors to
recover their investment from the underwriter. Id.
304. Infra Part V.B.1-2.
305. See Cagin Pabuccu, SecuritizationLitigation: Classificationof Theories of Liability, 16.1
J. STRUCTURED FINANCE 65, 66 (2010) (noting that the large number of parties involved in the
securitization process leads to the complexity of the investments).
306. Pabuccu, supra note 305, at 66. The progression of mortgage issuance to securitization
would look something like the following: Jane Doe (borrower) goes into XYZ Mortgage Inc.
(mortgage broker) to obtain a mortgage for her new home. XYZ shows Jane a 30-year loan
offered by IndyMacy Bank (lender)-Jane accepts. IndyMacy sells Jane's loan to Lyman Bros.
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of private-label securitization, as many as eight of ten different roles
(mortgage broker, lender, servicer, sponsor, depositor, trust/trustee,
insurer, and investor) could be filled by one investment bank through its
many subsidiaries. 307 The process is laden with loan documents at
every step, and since the bursting of the credit bubble in 2008, legal
disputes have arisen among parties throughout the chain.308 For the
purposes of this Subpart, recourse sought by an investor against the
investment bank will be examined. 309

Investment Bank (underwriter), but maintains the responsibility of sending Jane monthly
statements and collecting payments (servicer). Lyman Bros. sells the loan to Lyman Real Estate
Inc. (depositor). Lyman Real Estate Inc. transfers Jane's loan, along with a thousand other loans
it purchased from Lyman Bros., to Lyman Trust (trust/trustee). Lyman Trust pools these loans
together to form a trust called MBS 1, the mortgage-backed security. NBS 1 gets Moodie's
(rating agency) to rate the security and also gets GIA (insurer) to insure the entire pool against
default. MBS 1 files a registration statement with the SEC. Upon approval of the filing, Lyman
Trust transfers MBS 1 back to Lyman Real Estate Inc. Lyman Real Estate Inc. sells MBS 1 to
Lyman Bros. Investment Bank. Lyman Bros. markets and sells the MBS to Illinois Lawyers
Pension Fund, Ultra Safe Investments Bond Fund, and other institutions (investors).
307. See Press Release, Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA Sues UBS to Recover
Losses to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (July 27, 2011) (on file with author) (describing that, in
its suit against UBS, the FHFA, as plaintiff, listed as defendants UBS Americas, Inc. (corporate
parent), UBS Real Estate Securities Inc. (depositor/lender), UBS Securities, LLC (underwriter),
Mortgage Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc. (trust/trustee, also owned by UBS Americas),
and four former UBS executives); see also Press Release, FHFA Sues 17 Firms to Recover
Losses to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/
webfiles/22599/PLSLitigation final_090211 .pdf (discussing the seventeen complaints the FHFA
filed to recover losses stemming from purchases of private-label MBSs that are similar to the
UBS suit in July, and listing the seventeen banks as: Ally Financial Inc. /k/a GMAC, LLC, Bank
of America Corporation, Barclays Bank PLC, Citigroup, Inc., Countrywide Financial
Corporation, Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc., Deutsche Bank AG, First Horizon National
Corporation, General Electric Company, Goldman Sachs & Co., HSBC North America Holdings,
Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Merrill Lynch & Co. / First Franklin Financial Corp., Morgan
Stanley, Nomura Holding America Inc., The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, and Socidt6
G6ndrale).
308. See Pabuccu,supra note 305, at 66-76 (stating that actions between securitization parties
include: breach of contract (subscription agreement, indenture agreement, reference pool side
agreement, claims against trustees, claims against servicers); breach of representations and
warranties (breach of warranty of sellers, of the receivables, of document defects, early payment
warranty); tort claims (fiduciary duty, fraud: misrepresentation and non-disclosure); federal
securities fraud claims (1933 Act, 1934 Act); and rating agency claims (same federal acts and
negligent misrepresentation and fraud)).
309. See infra Part V.B.2. (discussing the potential for an investment bank to insulate itself
from statements made in a prospectus); see also McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 298, at
1357-58 (asserting that had there been laws imposing liability on investment banks and other
securitizers for financing abusive loans, securitizers might have exercised real due diligence).
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2. Potentially Insulating the Investment Bank from
Sections of the 1933 Act
In many cases, an investor will sue an investment bank for fraud
stemming from statements that were material misrepresentations,
misleading, or omitted during the initial sales process-all prohibited
under §§ 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act. 310 The plaintiff in such an
action does not have to prove that the defendant acted with scienter, as
promulgated under the PSLRA but does have to meet the PSLRA's
heightened pleading standard. 3 1 1 This heightened pleading standard has
310. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006)--§ 11-states:
(a) Persons possessing cause of action; persons liable
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of
such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity,
in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue-(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar
functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the
registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration
statement as being or about to become a director, person performing similar
functions, or partner;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement,
or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in
connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in
such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) holds liable any person who:
(2) offers or sells a security . . . by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission.
Id.; see also Pabuccu, supra note 305, at 73 (stating that the Court in Gustafson limited the scope
of liability under § 12(2) by not extending coverage to secondary market transactions).
311. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 21D(b)(1)(2), 109 Stat. 737 ("[T]he complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading,
the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."); see also Pabuccu, supra note 305, at 73
("[P]laintiffs must ensure that the complaint is sufficient in terms of clarity and sufficiency of the
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led to a large number of dismissals by courts-specifically, in
securitization litigation. 312 Heightened pleading makes it difficult for a
plaintiff to bring a complaint in a securitization action due to the lack of
information available to the plaintiff at the pleading stage. 313 Generally,
plaintiffs in securitization actions file claims based on conversations
with defendants and any publicly available information about the
investment, such as a prospectus or a registration statement, but this
limited available information makes getting through the pleading stage a
difficult task.314
Adding to the heightened standard, the decision in Janus has created
a potential blueprint for an investment bank to further shield itself from
liability.315 During the securitization process, the bank faces liability
when making oral or written misstatements, misrepresentations, and/or
omissions of material fact to investors during the initial offering of an
MBS. 316 Most liability stemming from written communication comes
from the registration statement, the filing of which is required when
offering an MBS to investors. 3 17 After Janus, an investment bank can
claims. The [PSLRA] tightened the pleading standards.").
312. Pabuccu, supra note 305, at 73 (discussing that in securities fraud actions under § 11,
"[there are significant numbers of dismissal motions granted to subprime securitization lawsuits
. . ."); see also Hutchison v. CBRE Realty Fin. Inc., 638 F. Supp.2d 265, 277 (D. Conn. 2009)
(granting the defendant's motion to dismiss after finding that the plaintiff failed to adequately
plead the materiality of the omissions in the defendant's registration statement and prospectus).
313. See Hutchison, 638 F. Supp.2d at 275 (discussing the lack of adequately pleading
materiality); see also Pabuccu, supra note 305, at 73 (stating that aside from well supported
factual allegations, the plaintiffs need to adequately plead materiality).
314. See Walker & Seymour, supra note 80, at 1015 (discussing the coverage of § 10(b) as
including "[a]ny person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the
requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb-5 are met").
315. See, e.g., Editorial,supra note 288 (asserting that JCG and JCM used legal ventriloquism
to commit fraud through the mutual fund business trust they established); Stohr, supra note 275
(statement of Chicago-Kent College of Law Professor William Birdthistle) (asserting that the
Janus decision has created a blueprint for companies looking to escape liability from statements
they make); Gordon, supra note 210 (asking why the Court in Janus wants to insulate fraudulent
corporate actors from liability).
316. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (discussing liability for parties involved in an initial public
offering); see also Pabuccu, supra note 305, at 72 (stating that § 11 imposes liability on a wide
range of persons if a registration statement contains untrue statements of a material fact or omits
material facts that would be required for an investor to make an informed decision).
317. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (describing liability for misstatements made in a registration
statement); see also Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMIssioN, http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (listing the
essential facts that a company needs to include in a registration statement: "[a] description of the
company's properties and business; [a] description of the security to be offered for sale;
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Consider this example: if a
theoretically buffer that liability."'
mortgage trust is set up by an investment bank as a separate legal entity
with a board of directors, statements made in the registration statement
are under the ultimate authority of the mortgage trust. 319 The trust can
hire the investment bank, not as an underwriter, but as an asset advisor,
distributor, and/or an administrative agent. 320 Even if the bank helps to
pick the loans and sell the investments, it can argue that it is merely an
advisor or a distributor of products, similar to a mutual fund advisor,
leaving the trust as the entity solely in control of potentially misleading
statements. 32 1 Hence, the investment bank would not be liable as a
primary actor as defined by Janus.322 Notwithstanding the influence
and entwinement between the bank and the trust, a court could find it
difficult to disregard the corporate form; a private right of action under
federal securities laws may cease to be an option for an investor who
may be defrauded in this scenario. 323
[i]nformation about the management of the company; and [f]inancial statements certified by
independent accounts").
318. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (referencing several commentators who feel
that the Court is providing market actors a means by which to escape liability from securities
fraud).
319. See Press Release, supra note 307 (noting that in the FHFA's complaint against UBS,
one of the parties named was Mortgage Asset Securitization Transactions Inc. ("MAST"), a
wholly owned subsidiary of UBS). The question raised by Janus would seem to indicate that if
UBS had set up MAST as a standalone separate business trust, similar to the Janus Funds, could
UBS Americas, UBS Securities, or UBS Real Estate Securities have been liable for statements
made in the registration statement filed by MAST as to the loans in its portfolio? The situation in
Janus does involve an initial public offering, which is governed under 1933 Act; however, the
majority opinion in Janus did not specify as to limits of its new rule. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v.
First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011). The Court simply stated, "[Tihe maker of
a statement is the entity with authority over the content of the statement and whether and how to
communicate it. Without such authority, it is not 'necessary or inevitable' that any falsehood will
be contained in the statement." Id.
320. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 201, at 17 (asserting that if the defendants'
argument in Janus wins, it would show potential future perpetrators that all they need to do in
order to avoid certain forms of securities fraud is to structure a business to mirror the mutual fund
industry).
321. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (D. Md. 2007) (quoting In re
MTC Elec. Tech. S'holder Litig., 993 F. Supp. 160, 161-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)) (noting that an
underwriter could be liable for preparing and disseminating a misleading prospectus because of
the "central role underwriters play in the issuance of securities and the special reliance placed on
them by prospective investors"), rev'd, 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009). The district court saw fit to
include the distinction of an underwriter; however, the Court in Janus gave no such limitation.
See supra note 320 (explaining the potential impact of the Janus decision).
322. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305 (concluding that since the misstatements in the Janus
Funds' prospectus were made by the Janus Funds and not the investment advisor, the plaintiffs
had not stated a claim against the advisor under Rule 1Ob-5).
323. A plaintiff would not use § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in this scenario because it involves an
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VI. CONCLUSION

Leading up to the Great Depression, it was evident that the risk of
facing legal action under common contract law did not serve as a
deterrent for corporate managers. 324 Reckless corporate disregard for
economic norms and negligently exposing investors to great risks was a
function of the marketplace and compounded the effects of the ensuing
depression. 325 The Congressional securities regulation of the 1930s
served to effectively curtail much of the abuses and hold those who
commit fraud duly accountable. 326 Federal courts saw fit to create and
enforce an implied private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
as a means of further strengthening the legal options of investors. 32 7
Unfortunately, Janus is the latest in a long line of Supreme Court
decisions in the past several decades that were meant to weaken and
substantially narrow private action claims under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob5.328 The Court-with Congress's help through legislation such as the
PSLRA-has succeeded towards that end. Be that as it may, the market
initial public offering and, more importantly, it would be incredibly difficult to show scienter at
the initial offering stage without the help of discovery. See Murdock supra note 75, at 176 ("[A]
plaintiff must provide, in great detail, all the relevant facts forming the basis of her belief. It is
not sufficient for a plaintiffs pleadings to set forth a belief that certain unspecified sources will
reveal, after appropriate discovery, facts that will validate her claim."); see also Ramirez, supra
note 65, at 1074 (asserting that the scienter pleading requirement under the PSLRA has raised the
question of whether it can be satisfied at all, unless there are explicit admissions of an intent to
defraud).
324. See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943) (discussing the
business of investing, Judge Charles Clark pointedly stated that the "well-known 'blue sky laws'
of 43 states have in fact proved inadequate"); see also Welle, supra note 16, at 533-34 (noting
that federal securities laws were initially created to eliminate serious abuses found in unregulated
capital markets and to supplant state laws that were designed to simply protect from fraudulent
and unethical schemes).
325. See Larry Bumgardner, Reforming Corporate America: How Does the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act Impact American Business?, 6 GRAZIADIO BUS. REv. (2003), available at
http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/reforming-corporate-americal (discussing fraudulent activities
that took place prior to the market crash, including having publicists inflate stock prices, family
insider trading, manipulation of the market and specific stocks, high salaries and interest-free
loans for corporate executives, tax avoidance schemes, and investment banks allowing politicians
and other corporate executives to buy initial offerings at artificially low prices).

326. See Charles Hughes, 139 F.2d at 437 ("The essential objective of securities legislation is
to protect those who do not know market conditions from the overreaching of those who do.").
327. See Welle, supra note 16, at 550 (stating that rather than depending less on federal
securities laws, we should encourage efforts that aim to strengthen and streamline those we have).
328. See Rochelle Bobroff, Liberal Justices Miss the Point in Recent Court Access Cases,

ACS BLOG (June 16, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/liberal-justices-miss-the-point-inrecent-court-access-cases (noting that from the early 1990s up to his retirement, Justice Stevens
tirelessly fought the five-vote conservative majority in their effort to erode the ability of private
individuals to enforce progressive federal laws).
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may be faced with having to deal with the unintended consequences
inherent in a loosely regulated marketplace where private investors have
minimal options for recourse. 329

329. See id. (asserting that if the Court continues to restrict private rights of action under
federal laws, individuals could find it difficult to bring forth actions related to discrimination, the
right to monetary relief from corporate fraud, and the right of poor children to medical insurance
to pay for developmental screening).

